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“He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he
who lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me.”
– Thomas Jefferson, August 13, 1813

Executive Summary:
Patent protections on biomedical innovations help incentivize the development of new
devices and drugs. In the field of clinical diagnostics, however, patents on human DNA can
impede the development of better test methods and delay patient access to clinical care. An oftcited example is the case of Myriad Genetics, in which patents on two genes linked to hereditary
breast and ovarian cancer (BRCA1/2) prevented university labs from developing and providing
testing for high-risk patients.
Myriad’s actions have roused the ire of researchers, clinicians and patient interest groups
within the healthcare community and have led to government action in many countries. This is
not, however, the first controversy over the role of gene patents in biomedical technology. Since
1980, when the Supreme Court granted patentability to life forms and Congress made federally
funded research patentable, various researchers and firms have attempted to monopolize genomic
discoveries through aggressive patenting strategies. Members of the biotechnology industry
argue that these patent-backed monopolies promote innovation by encouraging private
investment in basic research. Critics, however, warn that these monopolies can impede
innovation by preventing others from building on the findings of the patent holder. By
preventing researchers and clinicians from accessing key segments of the human genome, gene
patents can create a harmful legal environment that undermines the development of new clinical
diagnostics. Many point to the Myriad controversy as an example of how gene patents can block
research critical to the study of a major hereditary disease.
In an effort to evaluate these critics’ arguments in context, this essay will study the
prevailing ideas behind their claims in four stages: It will: 1. Discuss the theories behind the
patenting of DNA fragments using historical examples of past gene patent controversies, 2. Use
the Myriad BRCA1/2 case to examine the impact of gene patents on public research and
healthcare systems, 3. Address recent policy suggestions from the US Department of Health and
Human Services and 4. Trace the development of the ongoing court battle over Myriad’s
remaining patents. The essay will then explore the current progress of genomic scale sequencing
technology, and suggest that the infringement liability exemption is the best means of securing
research and diagnostic access to patented genes. By drawing insights from theory, jurisprudence
and empirical evidence, this paper will argue that Congress should propose this policy in the
spirit of Article 1.8.8 of the Constitution and Title 35 of the United States Code. While the
exemption avoids the “Gordian knot” solution of eliminating all gene-related patents, it presents
a safer solution that avoids inadvertent shocks to other research fields, such as therapeutics
development. By striking a better balance between incentives for private investment and
protections for scientific inquiry, this rule would help Congress, the courts and federal agencies
pursue the goal of scientific progress as expressed in our nation’s constitution.
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Introduction:
Last December, clinicians, researchers and patients represented by the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) petitioned the Supreme Court for a rehearing of Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology et al. v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office et al.1 In its 2-1 ruling on July 29, 2011,
the three-judge panel representing the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) had
upheld Myriad’s product patent claims on the BRCA1/2 genes.2 The majority ruling from the
CAFC asserted that these patents were valid because isolated DNA fragments were “not a
purified form of a natural material, but a distinct chemical entity.”3 Counsel for the plaintiff,
however, argued that that court failed to properly consider the fact that these “gene fragments
with the altered chemical structure…[already] exist in nature.”4
How did the semantics of DNA become the basis for such heated legal debate? One
reason is the issue’s relevance to the debate over human gene patents in biomedical research.
By aggressively patenting the genetic mutations behind hereditary predispositions for breast and
ovarian cancer, Myriad Genetics managed to land in the eye of an ongoing policy storm over
biomedical patent policy.5 Proponents of gene patents assert that they promote access to new
research by encouraging firms to invest in new discoveries. They warn that eliminating gene
patents will cause firms to abandon the pursuit of critical medical technologies, because weak

1

The case was Ass’n for Molecular Pathology et al. v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office et al. until after the CAFC
ruling, which removed the USPTO (United States Patent and Trademark Office) as party to the case. The case is
now referred to as Ass’n for Molecular Pathology et. al. v. Myriad Genetics et. al.
2
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology et al. v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office et al., 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Although the court ruled that the method claims were no longer patentable in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Bilski, it upheld Myriad’s ‘composition of matter’ claims on the normal and mutated sequences of the BRCA1/2
genes, e.g. claims 1, 2, 5 under U.S. Patent 5,747,282.
3
Id. at 1352.
Note that on March 26, 2012, the Supreme Court decided to grant the petition for certiorari but vacated and
remanded the case back to the CAFC. The effects of this decision will be discussed later in this essay.
4
Christopher A. Hansen, “Plaintiffs-Appellees’ Petition for Panel Rehearing,” (August 25, 2011): 1. Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology et al. v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office et al., 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
5
E. Richard Gold and Julia Carbone. "Myriad Genetics: In the Eye of the Policy Storm," Genetics in Medicine 12
(2010): S49.
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patents would make it more difficult for them to prevent freeriding and protect profits. In
response, opponents argue that these patents allow harmful monopolies that reduce patient access
to better care. While gene patents can create substantial economic incentives for developers of
biologic diagnostics and therapeutics, they can also stymie subsequent medical progress and
reduce downstream research by monopolizing access to fundamental discoveries in the human
genome.
In the US today, gene patent policy continues to be treated as a technical and
administrative matter relegated to oversight and review by the USPTO. The arguments raised
against the BRCA1/2 patents suggest that this passive approach is inadequate for the regulation
of intellectual property rights over the human genome. In 2011 alone, the American Cancer
Society anticipated approximately 230,480 new cases of invasive breast cancer, 21,990 new
cases of ovarian cancer and a combined 54,980 deaths due to the two diseases.6 Despite the fact
that more reliable and affordable BRCA1/2 testing will help identify patients with hereditary
predispositions, target them for intensive surveillance and ultimately help save their lives,
Myriad’s BRCA1/2 patents continue to prevent researchers from providing second opinion
testing and more cost-effective tests. On the other hand, eliminating gene patents might have
crippling effects on the biotechnology industry’s ability to develop therapeutics for these and
other chronic diseases. According to the Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO), the
majority of biotechnology firms in-license early-stage discoveries.7 Recent studies suggest that
new biotechnology-related drugs cost on average over $1.2 billion to bring to market, and

6

Statistics from Breast Cancer Facts & Figures 2011-2012. Atlanta: American Cancer Society, Inc., (2011): 2, and
the Ovarian Cancer National Alliance at <www.ovariancancer.org>
39,520 deaths were due to breast cancer and 15,460 deaths were due to ovarian cancer.
7
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology et al. v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and Myriad Genetics, Inc., 702 F. Supp.
2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (slip op., at 77).
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successfully gain approval only 30% of the time.8 Absent patent protection, biopharmaceutical
developers might face greater difficulty in procuring new projects and protecting them.
As a critical component of US healthcare policy, gene patents are part of a greater “social
contract”9 designed to balance between private interests and public wellbeing. While these
restrictions on the use of knowledge are designed to reward individuals for their inventions, they
ultimately entail a quid pro quo – patent holders must disclose information that will enhance the
social benefit derived from the claimed technology. In order to attain the ultimate goal of
biomedical innovation, then, gene patent policy must ensure that follow-on, “downstream”
research is not disproportionally impeded for the sake of rewarding patent-holders upstream.
The human cost imposed by these patents cannot be justified otherwise. While upstream
innovation is a necessary component of new product development, it is not a sufficient condition
for the creation of those clinically effective drugs and DNA sequencers that will help save lives.
In the last half decade, Myriad has refused to provide data from its testing business to the
National Institutes of Health’s (NIH) Breast Cancer Information Core (BIC), citing its concern
that its competition might benefit from it.10 This patent-backed monopoly over critical
information has blocked the efforts of geneticists and researchers seeking to study the
demographics of those genetic mutations related to breast and ovarian cancer. For the last
eighteen years, Myriad has enforced its monopoly rights on both the isolated DNA fragments
that code for BRCA1/2 and the ability to perform diagnostic testing for those genes. In the
absence of a robust research exemption from infringement liability following the Federal

8

Brief for the Biotechnology Industry Organization as Amicus Curiae, 25. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology et al. v.
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office et al., 653 F. 3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
9
Geertrui van Overwalle. "Turning Patent Swords into Shares," Science 330 (2010): 1630.
10
Andrew Pollack. "Despite Gene Patent Victory, Myriad Genetics Faces Challenges," New York Times, 24 August
2011.
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Circuit’s ruling in Madey v. Duke University,11 Myriad’s actions highlight a current imbalance
between incentives and access in US patent policy – one in which the social distortions and
economic inefficiencies of patents are outweighing their marginal social benefits.12 By impeding
the development of more advanced gene diagnostics and blocking clinical inquiry into a patient’s
own DNA, this imbalance may undermine the goal of scientific progress sought in Article 1,
Section 8, Clause 8 of the US Constitution, and lead to grave consequences for women at risk of
breast and ovarian cancer.
Though the Myriad controversy may seem at first to be the exception to the norm, it is
rather an extension of a gene patent debate that has been going on over the past three decades.
Since the passage of the Bayh Dole Act in 1980, breakthroughs in gene sequencing and
manipulation have catalyzed growing concern over the fact that patents can hinder innovation as
well as support it. As new discoveries in biotechnology translate into biomedical innovations,
the restrictive effects of gene patents become increasingly apparent. In order to fully understand
the current debate surrounding Myriad’s BRCA1/2 patents, then, we must first understand the
background and development of this debate, including the theoretical arguments that have helped
formalize it.

Background and Theory:
Biomedical patents: purpose and policy
In an earlier era, Sir Isaac Newton furthered his knowledge “by standing on the shoulders
of giants.” Were he alive today, he might be charged a fee. In the United States, Article 1.8.8 of
the Constitution entrusts Congress with the power to grant patents in order to “promote the
11

Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F. 3d. 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Stiglitz Decl., (19 January 2010): 5, 11-16. filed in Ass’n for Molecular Pathology et al. v. U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office and Myriad Genetics, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
12
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progress of science and the useful arts.” Congress defines the conditions for patentability in Title
35 of the United States Code, which grants patents for inventions and discoveries that are useful,
novel, and nonobvious.13 According to Section 101, “Whoever invents or discovers any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements
of this title.”14 Owners can license their patented findings on an exclusive basis so as to prevent
others from selling, making or using them. In exchange, the law limits the patent’s life to twenty
years and requires that the patent application describe the finding in a way that would allow
similarly skilled individuals to replicate it.15 Furthermore, implicit exceptions within Section
101 deny patentability to claims on “Laws of nature, natural phenomena and abstract ideas.”16
The main goal of patent policy is to bring new and useful discoveries into the public
domain. By rewarding inventors with legal monopoly rights against pure market competition,
patents allow the research community to learn from ideas that inventors might otherwise hide as
trade secrets. They allow inventors to cover the high costs of research by exclusively licensing
these rights to private investors, who bear the financial burden but also reap the economic returns
on these discoveries. Although traditional proponents of laissez faire may object to the
monopolistic elements of patents, most economists believe that the benefits gained through
intellectual property rights outweigh their potential costs to market efficiency. In How Markets
Fail, John Cassidy helps explain this view by elaborating on knowledge as a public good.17
Research projects often involve a substantial amount in upfront investments, and thus require
13

35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103
35 U.S.C. §101
15
35 U.S.C. §112
16
Mayo et al. v. Prometheus, 566 U.S. ___ (2012) (slip op., at 1); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981);
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op., at 5); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980); Le
Roy v. Tatham, 14 How. 156, 175 (1853); O’Reilly v. Morse 15 How. 62, 112-120 (1854).
17
John Cassidy, How Markets Fail: the Logic of Economic Calamities (New York: Picador, 2009), 133-137.
14
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long-term planning and stable revenues to recoup sunk costs. Because scientific knowledge is
nonrival-in-use and rival firms attempt to freeride off of each other’s discoveries, firms might not
invest enough in basic research unless patents are available to ensure a reasonable profit. Patents
can encourage investments by allowing patent-holding firms to retain a monopoly on basic
scientific discoveries while they develop commercially applicable inventions from them.
In the 1980s, two developments in US patent policy broadly expanded the realm of
patentable material and sparked an investment boom in the biotechnology industry. The first
came in June 16, 1980, when the Supreme Court held in Diamond v Chakrabarty (by a 5-4
ruling) that genetically engineered bacteria were patentable under Section 101 of Title 35
U.S.C.18 The profound significance of this case was that it extended patentability to life forms
that were not yet explicitly patentable under federal statute. In writing the majority opinion,
Chief Justice Warren Burger established that “the relevant distinction was not between living and
inanimate things, but between products of nature, whether living or not, and human-made
inventions.” Because Chakrabarty had made a new organism by engineering it with recombinant
DNA, it was a patentable ‘composition of matter.’19 The Supreme Court’s decision became a
major catalyst for investment in the biotechnology industry and the patenting of genetic material.
By defining the range of patentability as “anything under the sun that is made by man,” it
allowed private investors to invest in biotechnology R&D with the hope of commercializing a
broad portfolio of lucrative patents on life forms and DNA.20
The second major development came from outside of the courts. On December 12, 1980,
Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act to foster “the commercialization and allocation of rights in
18

Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 US 309 (1980).
Daniel Kevles. “Ananda Chakrabarty wins a patent: biotechnology, law, and society,” Hist Stud Phys Biol Sci. 25
(1994): 132.
20
Martin Adelman and Randall Rader, Cases and materials on patent law, 2nd ed. (St. Paul, MN: Thomson/West,
2003), 107-8.
19
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inventions resulting from federally sponsored research and development.”21 Congress intended
to achieve this goal by allowing universities and small businesses to patent and license federally
funded research. Prior to Bayh-Dole, the government owned roughly 30,000 patents on federally
funded research that had yet to be commercialized.22 These unused assets were somewhat
analogous to what Hernando de Soto refers to as “dead capital,” in that they lacked “value as
collateral for securing the interests of creditors.”23 Given the slumping economy at that time,
there was a growing interest in generating revenue and building new businesses from this
intellectual property. The legislators behind this act hoped that allowing universities and small
businesses to patent federally funded inventions would help them attract private investment and
encourage investors to commercialize their discoveries.24
By assigning researchers formal rights to their intellectual property and allowing private
actors to exchange those rights, Bayh-Dole helped turn new discoveries into what Hernando de
Soto would call “live capital.” The act helped channel investments into thousands of new
patents, companies and commercial products, and ultimately contributed to growth in the
domestic economy.25 As of 2003, “374 new companies based on an academic discovery were
formed [and] 4,081 new companies [had] been formed based on a license from an academic
institution.”26 By 2009, the latter number was over 4,500.27 Over 2,500 new commercial

21

Chester Moore. "Killing the Bayh-Dole Act's Golden Goose," Tulane Journal of Technology & Intellectual
Property 8 (2006): 153.
22
Ibid.
23
Hernando De Soto." Dead Capital and the Poor," SAIS Review 21.1 (2001): 17.
24
Arti Rai and Rebecca Eisenberg. "Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine," American Scientist 91,
no.1 (2003): 52.
25
Moore, 156.
26
Alfred Berkeley. “The Economic Impact of University Technologies,” Journal of Ass'n of University Technology
Managers 16 (2004): 4.
27
Samuel Loewenberg. “The Bayh-Dole Act: a Model for Promoting Research Translation?,” Molecular Oncology
3 (2009): 91.
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products between 1998 and 2003 relied on the licensing of university research,28 and 657 new
products were launched in 2010 alone.29 In the field of biotechnology, the yearly average
number of gene patents granted rose from 12 in the 1970s to 143 in the 1980s, and jumped to
1606 in the 1990s (Figure 1).30 Though much of the new wealth of genetic knowledge in the
1990s was the result of the Human Genome Project, the rapid rise in patents also reflected the
potency of the combination of Diamond v. Chakrabarty and the Bayh-Dole Act.

The anticommons threat to biomedical technology
Some critics, however, wondered whether the large number of new patents was indeed
beneficial to biomedical innovation. Chief among them were Michael Heller and Rebecca
Eisenberg, who were concerned that the growing number of patents on basic discoveries would
ultimately prevent firms from using them to develop more useful applications. In 1998 they
warned of a potential “tragedy of the anticommons,” in which the fragmentation of intellectual
property rights would prevent downstream innovators from gaining an “effective privilege of
use.”31 Heller and Eisenberg proposed two hypothetical mechanisms by which this might result:
either the fragmentation would require researchers to spend more than they can afford in license
fees, or patent-holders would use “reach-through” agreements to impose disproportionate
royalties on or take control of licensees’ future inventions later in the game.32 In the former
situation, patents would fail to produce commercially useful inventions because each patent
holder would try to maximize its profits from licensing fees and no researcher would be able to

28

Chester Moore. “Killing the Bayh-Dole Act's Golden Goose,” Tul. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 8 (2006): 155.
Ass'n of University Technology Managers, US Licensing Survey FY2010.
30
Sam Kean. “The Human Genome (Patent) Project,” Science 331 (2011): 531.
31
Michael A. Heller and Rebecca S. Eisenberg, “Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical
Research,” Science 280 (1998): 698.
32
Ibid., 699.
29
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buy enough licenses to invent a non-infringing product. In the latter scenario, researchers would
access patented discoveries using reach through licensing agreements (RTLA) but then face the
risk of being bankrupted by the royalties and restrictions subsequently imposed by the licensor.
To further illustrate Heller and Eisenberg’s article, James Buchanan and Yong Yoon
proposed a model that posited the anticommons theory as concept symmetric to the longstanding
“tragedy of the commons.” Using the stylized example of tickets to a busy parking lot,
Buchanan and Yoon demonstrate that the tragedies of both the commons and the anticommmons
“depend on the number of persons [or firms] assigned simultaneous rights.”33 When multiple
ticket issuers both have exclusive property rights to the parking lot, anyone who seeks to use the
lot must obtain a ticket from each owner and ultimately pay a higher price than they would for a
single ticket. Thus, while productivity is reduced by excessively high usage in the commons, it
is reduced by prohibitively high overhead cost in the anticommons. When multiple patents claim
gene fragments that are complementary to each other for the purpose of diagnosing or treating a
hereditary disease, each patent holder gains the ability to extract rents on anyone who attempts to
develop the test or drug downstream. Granted, one could argue that market competition from
other parking lots nearby could help bring down the high transaction costs created by the
anticommons. In genetics research however, there’s only one human genome. When a
particular test or drug requires access to a specific target gene, one cannot simply invent around a
patent that grants exclusive rights over the use of that gene.
Heller and Eisenberg’s proposed “tragedy of the anticommons” spurred a great debate
within the research community, and encouraged numerous other studies on the potential
development of a biomedical anticommons. Facing the dramatic rise in patent applications for

33

James Buchanan and Yong Yoon. "Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons," The Journal of Law and
Economics 43, no. 1 (2000): 4.
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fragments of DNA not specifically tied to an end product (i.e., Express Sequence Tags, or ESTs,
and Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms, or SNPs), a growing number of researchers became
concerned that the Bayh-Dole Act’s failure to distinguish between basic, research-enabling
discoveries and inventions with direct commercial applications would eventually lead to the
establishment of an anticommons in genetic research.34 For researchers engaged in genomic
sequencing during and after the Human Genome Project (HGP), the seriousness of these
concerns soon became apparent.

Patent wars over the human genome
ESTs are fragments of complementary DNA (cDNA) that capture the end portions of a
subject’s expressed genes (Figure 2). Since they express a small fraction of a gene rather than
the gene’s entire sequence, they are used as identification markers for their respective genes.
EST patenting creates an anticommons scenario because the development of end products such
as therapeutics and diagnostics requires the use of multiple fragments.35 In the 1990s, however,
NIH researcher Craig Venter began to patent ESTs en masse by sequencing thousands of them
through automated machines.36 By 1994, he and the NIH had filed a claim for almost 7,000 of
these fragments.37
In order to produce the thousands of patent applications at such a rapid pace, Venter
attempted to patent the various ESTs before fully understanding the genes that they
represented.38 The methods he used were obvious to competent researchers in his field, but he

34

Rai, 55.
Heller, 699.
36
Daniel Kevles and Ari Berkowitz. "The Gene Patenting Controversy: A Convergence of Law, Economic Interests,
and Ethics," Brooklyn Law Review 67 (2002): 236.
37
Ibid.
38
Ibid., 237.
35
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attempted to patent his sequences even in the absence of a clear inventive step. According to
Nobel laureate James D. Watson, this was “sheer lunacy” given that “virtually any monkey”
could conduct such research.39 Despite the lack of new insight it generated, however, Venter’s
rent-seeking strategy seemed poised to lock up a significant portion of the human genome even
before it could be adequately explored. As Genentech’s lawyer put it, “If these things are
patentable, there’s going to be an enormous cDNA arms race.”40 In response to the concerns
raised by Venter’s efforts, the USPTO rejected his initial patent applications in 1992 and the NIH
withdrew all of its EST patent applications in 1994. Venter, however, continued to file thousands
of EST at a nonprofit cooperating with Human Genome Sciences Inc. Other companies such as
Incyte Pharmaceuticals soon followed suit, filing claims on over 40,000 EST and planning to file
for almost 100,000 each year.41
In 1998, Venter moved to Celera, a for-profit company that had adopted a slightly revised
approach towards patenting these basic research-enabling markers. By using computerized
genome databases to find known genes that had a structure similar to that found in a new EST,
researchers at the company would guess at the function of the gene it represented and then use
this explanation to apply for a patent on that EST.42 This practice cast even further doubt on the
utility grounds for Celera’s new EST patents. The guessing game used to apply for the patents
demonstrated not so much an aptitude for producing new and useful findings, but rather a
willingness to conduct routine, mechanical work based on prior discoveries. Meanwhile, Celera
continued to restrict public access to its EST findings out of concern that competitors would

39

Ibid.
Ibid.
41
Ibid, 240.
42
Ibid, 247.
40
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“repackage their data and sell it in competition with them.”43 Ironically, the firm included in its
own patent claims data that had already been made public by Human Genome Project
researchers through the GenBank database.44
As the EST patenting competition built up steam, the race to patent SNPs raised an even
more fundamental concern from the research community. SNPs are point mutations that affect
the expression of individual genes (Figure 3). Whereas EST patents could be used to
monopolize a specific method of identifying a target gene (using the claimed EST as a probe),
SNP patents could claim the target gene itself. Without a license from the SNP patent-holder,
researchers could be blocked entirely from studying correlations between a given mutation of a
gene and its physical expression.45 Such situations would create problems beyond the
anticommons dilemma present in the EST patent race.46 Instead of reducing public access by
imposing higher transaction costs, the SNP patent completely blocked public access by
monopolizing a fundamental discovery. In order to build as broad a monopoly as possible, many
startup companies in the 1990s began to file for patents on these SNPs.
As the total number of claims leapt exponentially, the EST and SNP arms race triggered
responses from both academia and government. In February 1996, the UK-based Wellcome
Trust sponsored a strategy meeting in which researchers from the NIH National Center for
Human Genomic Research agreed to the Bermuda rules, which required the release of all newly

43

Rebecca Eisenberg. “Genomics in the public domain: strategy and policy,” Nature 1 (2000): 73.
Ibid.
45
John Barton. “Patents, Genomics, Research and Diagnostics,” Academic Medicine 77, no.12 (Suppl.) (2002):
1339-40.
46
Ibid., 1340. For traits governed by a single gene, the issue here would be a restriction on a foundational discovery,
not multiple rights to the same SNP. Most traits, however, are determined by the combined influence of multiple
genes. In this situation, SNP patents on different genes that all affect a single trait would lead to an anticommons
scenario in which multiple rights-holders would be able to mutually exclude each other from developing a
comprehensive diagnostic test for the given trait. See the hypothetical argument made in by Barton for more details.
44
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sequenced assemblies of DNA on a daily basis.47 In March of 2000, the presidents of both the
Royal Society of London and the US National Academy of Sciences warned that EST patents,
although in the interests of short-term shareholders, would “not serve society well.”48 That same
month, President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Tony Blair issued a joint public statement
asserting that “raw fundamental data on the human genome, including the human DNA sequence
and its variations, should be made freely available to scientists everywhere.”49 In 2001, the
USPTO finally clarified its utility guidelines towards patent claims on ESTs, requiring the
identification of the represented gene and its function.50
Interestingly, some of the strongest responses towards the EST/SNP patenting craze came
not from researchers and regulators but from leading firms within the biotechnology industry. In
the mid 1990s, Merck partnered with Washington University in St. Louis to publish sequences of
cDNA for the public.51 Although Merck’s former VP of research subsequently stated that the
firm did not seek to purposely undermine anyone’s intellectual rights,52 the Merck Genome
Initiative served in the earlier years as a means of responding to other firms’ efforts to patent
ESTs.53 In the spring of 1999, ten pharmaceutical companies joined the Wellcome Trust to
establish and fund a new private nonprofit, The SNP Consortium.54 The Consortium made it its

47

Summary of the Principles Agreed at the first International Strategy Meeting on Human Genome Sequencing,
U.S. Department of Energy, Human Genome Project Information, (28 February 1996).
48
Bruce Alberts and Sir Aaron Klug. “The Human Genome Itself Must be Freely Available to All Humankind,”
Nature 404 (2000): 325, quoted in Daniel Kevles and Ari Berkowitz, "The Gene Patenting Controversy: A
Convergence of Law, Economic Interests, and Ethics," Brooklyn Law Review 67 (2002): 247.
49
Eisenberg, Genomics, 71.
50
Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001)
51
Rebecca Eisenberg. “Intellectual Property Issues in Genomics,” Trends in Biotechnology 14 (1996): 304.
52
Alan Williamson. “The Merck Genome Indexing Project,” Drug Discoveries and Therapeutics 4, no.3 (1999):
118.
53
Eisenberg, Genomics, 72. By releasing them to the public and establishing them as prior art, although this
strategy became irrelevant with the new USPTO utility guidelines regarding ESTs in 2001.
54
Arthur Holden. “The SNP Consortium: Summary of a Private Consortium Effort to Develop an Applied Map of
the Human Genome,” Biotechniques 32 (2002): S23. The ten companies were: Bayer Group AG, Bristol-Myers
Squibb Company, Glaxo Wellcome PLC, Aventis, Monsanto Company, Novartis AG, Pfizer Inc, Roche Holding
Ltd., SmithKline Beecham PLC, and Zeneca Group PLC. The initial funding totaled $53 million.
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explicit objective to “manage publication of the resulting SNP map in a manner intended to
maximize the number of SNPs that enter the public domain (as that term is understood in patent
law).”55 In essence, the perceived threat of balkanization was so great that the pharmaceutical
industry ultimately decided to release SNP data to the public.56 Rather than publish its findings
immediately like the researchers who followed the Bermuda rules, the Consortium filed
Statutory Invention Regulations (SIR) to the Patent Office. While this practice delayed the
release of the Consortium’s data to a quarterly basis, it allowed the Consortium to prevent other
firms from using the released findings data to file their own patents.57
The development of strategies such as the Consortium within the biomedical technology
industry reflected a growing discrepancy between the original purpose of patents and the
practices allowed by gene patent policy. Despite patent policy’s intended role as a means of
incentivizing innovation, the continuous stream of patent claims from firms such as Incyte and
Human Genome Sciences was driving up the cost of downstream innovation on more developed,
useful products such as therapeutic drugs. The trickle had become a torrent, and leading drug
manufacturers such as Pfizer and SmithKline Beecham were paying millions of dollars just to
gain access to patented genetic information.58 In 1995, then Chairman of the Council of
Economic Advisers Joseph Stiglitz warned that because “one innovation builds on another,” “the
breadth and utilization of patent rights can be used not only to stifle competition but also have

55

Ibid.
Rai, 55.
57
Eisenberg, Genomics, 72. SIRs have attributes similar to those of patents but do not grant the right to exclude
others from “making, using, selling or importing the invention.” They also require the applicant to waive the right to
pursue a patent for a certain length of time.
58
Lori Andrews. "The Gene Patent Dilemma: Balancing Commercial Incentives with Health Needs," Houston
Journal of Health Law and Policy 2 (2002): 85.
“Pfizer reportedly paid $15.75 million to Incyte Pharmaceuticals for access to their DNA database and SmithKline
Beecham has paid $125 million to Human Genome Sciences for access to its genetic information.”
56

18

adverse effects in the long run on innovation.”59 Economist Carl Shapiro followed up in 2001
with his warning of the “patent thicket,” which asserted that the thicket of patent rights on the
complementary components of downstream products was creating holdup problems by exposing
product developers to higher costs and potential infringement liability.60

A failure to protect free inquiry
In order to address and avoid this barrier to innovation, the NIH developed a set of
guidelines for recipients of its research grants. Designed to encourage the sharing of biomedical
and genetic research tools developed with public funding, the guidelines stated that “proprietary
rights in research tools that do not require further development may function more as a tax on
commercial development than as a source of rights to preserve the viability of end products and
to motivate further investment.”61 Much of the momentum behind these guidelines came from
NIH Director Harold Varmus, who had established the working committee behind the guidelines
and had begun his term by removing Venter’s initial EST claims in 1994. Under Varmus, the
NIH worked to expand researchers’ access to patented genetic research tools held by patent
holders and their exclusive licensees.62 While respecting patent holders’ and licensors’ rights to
exclude commercial competitors from using their intellectual property, the NIH attempted to
worked out an explicit “research exemption” that would protect university research from liability
for patent infringement.
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Because these liability exemptions had to be negotiated on a case-by-case basis,
university researchers often invoked the common law research exemption when an explicit
agreement was not available. Stemming from Judge Learned-Hand’s decision in the appellate
ruling Whittemore v. Cutter, the common law research exemption provided an affirmative
defense for those who infringe patents “merely for philosophical experiments, or for the purpose
of ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine to produce its described effects.”63 In 2002,
however, the Federal Circuit ruled in Madey v. Duke University that universities could be sued
for patent infringement despite their non-profit status.64 In its ruling in favor of the plaintiff, the
court argued that any act “in furtherance of the alleged infringer’s legitimate business” going
beyond “strictly philosophical inquiry” did not qualify as exempted experimental use.65 By
including nonprofit university research in its broad definition of “legitimate business,” this case
rendered the common law research exemption effectively null.66
In light of the concerns raised by the EST/SNP patents and this new threat of
infringement liability for basic genomic research, US Congressmembers Lynn Rivers (D-MI)
and Dave Weldon (R-FL) introduced the Genomic Research and Diagnostic Accessibility Act
(“GRDAA”) to the House floor on March 14, 2002. Though it did not attempt to remove human
genes from the realm of patentability, the GRDAA proposed an infringement liability exemption
for noncommercial research on genetic sequence information and protection against infringement
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remedies for physician-conducted gene testing for medical purposes.67 To address the broader
issue of patentability, Rivers and Weldon introduced a companion bill, the Genomic Science and
Technology Innovation Act.68 This companion bill called on the White House Office of Science
and Technology Policy to begin a study on federal patent policy towards genes and its impact on
the development of new technologies.69 Combined, the acts were designed to address both the
immediate public health need for clinical diagnostics and long-term goals for biomedical
innovation. Unfortunately, the bills died in committee and Rivers was unable to win her
reelection bid. Weldon sponsored a subsequent bill (the Genomic Research and Accessibility
Act, or “GRAA”) with Xavier Becerra in 2007, but the GRAA was worded too broadly and
failed to gain enough support to pass through committee.70
Since then, the USPTO has for the most part determined de facto policy towards human
gene patents. Despite public commentary in favor of stricter regulations over gene patents, the
USPTO’s policies have allowed for the rapid expansion of gene patentability. While proponents
of expansive intellectual property rights point to the rapid growth of the US biotech industry as a
vindication of this position, opponents have argued that the combination of Madey and the
growing number of gene patents have imposed an increasingly restrictive IP regime that slows
downstream innovation and delays access to clinical diagnostics. With the curtailment of the
common law research exemption to only that which is unrelated to the “legitimate business” of
an institution, Bayh-Dole might have the ironic effect of increasing the risks associated with
research and innovation while reducing the risks for those who invest in patenting it. Although
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an observable, widespread anticommons scenario has yet to emerge, the past history of gene
patenting has raised important questions and issues that have yet to be fully explored.

Current practice and the clinical diagnostics dilemma:
The answer to these questions, however, is not simply a matter of per se patentability for
all DNA. As noted earlier, one reason that the Becerra-Weldon bill failed to make it out of
committee was that its scope was not designed proportionally to the problem. Although it
succeeded in publicizing legitimate concerns over the effects of patents on the development of
genetic diagnostics, the Becerra-Weldon bill also extended beyond the Rivers-Weldon bill and
attempted to cover any nucleotide sequence, including those that were synthetically designed for
use in therapeutic drugs. The radical nature of this proposal drew a strong response from the
biotechnology industry, which lobbied to defeat Becerra-Weldon before it was put to a vote. In
his testimony to House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Courts, the Internet,
and Intellectual Property in October 2007, attorney Jeffrey Kushnan from BIO asserted that
“Concerns that basic research will face significant new obstacles from patent litigation are
unfounded and not borne out by experience, either from before or after the Madey decision.”71
Mr. Kushnan’s comment conveniently ignores the fact that public concern over the
significant obstacles that surfaced in the EST and SNP patent race played a large role in
stemming the tide of junk patents and avoiding potential patent litigation. It does, however, help
illustrate a critical point regarding current practices in the field of genetic research. As Dr. Jon
Soderstrom explained in the same House Committee hearing, forbearance on the part of patent
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holders and exclusive licensors often allow for a de facto research exemption.72 Given that most
researchers agree with the general consensus that naturally occurring genes in the human body
should not be patentable, 73 there seems to be a culture of forbearance in the biomedical research
community that reduces the need for a legal defense.
Outside of clinical diagnostics, many studies have shown that the Heller and Eisenberg’s
hypothesized mechanisms are not widely substantiated by empirical data. The National
Academy of Sciences estimates that 3,000+ new gene patents have been issued per year since
1998, adding up to over 40,000 patents to governments, universities and for-profit entities
ranging from large firms the startups.74 Even with the large number of patents and the wide
range of interests behind them, studies in the U.S. and other large, developed economies have
found that anticommons problems have been fairly infrequent.75 Within the U.S., a study
showed only 1% of academic biomedical researchers reporting a project delay due to patents
held by other researchers.76 Given the empirical data above, it seems that researchers have
heeded Heller and Eisenberg’s warning and have largely avoided the anticommons problem.
Workaround agreements such as royalty offsets have prevented RTLAs and license stacking
from driving projects to a loss.77 Because researchers can try to invent around certain types of
patented discoveries, conduct their research offshore or challenge the validity of the patent,
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patent holders outside of the clinical diagnostics space often have an incentive to avoid raising
royalties beyond reasonable levels.78
For clinical diagnostics, however, individual patent holders can still bear a
disproportionately restrictive impact on medical innovation. As mentioned earlier, diagnostic
tests for mutations in specific genes cannot simply invent around patents claiming full rights to
the target genes themselves. Although it is currently in the process of seeking public
commentary regarding potential reforms,79 the USPTO still allows patents on foundational
discoveries for which no workaround solutions exist. These patents can prove to be a critical
obstacle for developers of new diagnostic methods. Because universities and firms are limited in
their ability to identify, evaluate and pursue opportunities for further development, the individual
patent holder is less likely to maximize the potential uses of a given discovery in the way that
multiple innovators would.80 If the patent holder maintains exclusivity over an entire area of
research, then, it could significantly stunt progress and impose the ultimate cost on those whose
lives might be saved through subsequent inventions.
Recent evidence supports the argument that gene patents exert a restrictive effect on
innovation in the field of clinical gene testing. One survey by Merz et al. showed that out of 119
US laboratories engaged in genetic testing for hemochromatosis, 30% of them either gave up or
stopped developing their tests after patents were issued on the HFE gene.81 Almost all of the 119
laboratories had known of the patent, and half had received cease-and-desist letters from the
exclusive licensor for the patents. In a phone survey by Cho et al., about a quarter of the
respondents “reported that they had stopped performing a clinical genetic test because of a patent
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or license.”82 Out of the thirty respondents who comprised that group, nearly a third of them
cited the BRCA1/2 patents currently held by Myriad Genetics (Figure 4).83
As noted earlier, the SNP race demonstrated the importance of securing research access
to basic discoveries and taking preemptive action against the development of biomedical
anticommons. If the government is to continue using patents to effectively promote
biotechnology R&D, it must keep in pace with current technology and address anticommons
issues proactively. While workaround solutions may help avoid the need for constant policy
revision, holding blind faith in the benevolence of patent holders may be a foolhardy decision.
In order to foster socially useful science while preserving the economic value of patent rights as
collateral, policymakers must delineate the standards of patentability in a way that promotes both
access to foundational discoveries and stronger intellectual property rights.
Due to the recent testimonies of many researchers and the relatively high level of social
awareness of breast cancer, the BRCA1/2 issue has become a particularly visible controversy.
Myriad, however, claims that it never blocked research on either gene.84 In the words of former
Myriad president Gregory Critchfield, “If you give test results back to patients, it crosses over
the line, and it’s no longer a simple research test. [It] is really a very bright line.”85 Many
researchers, however, argue that Mr. Critchfield’s assertion is not a practical assessment of
Myriad’s effects on clinical “research.” Cho asserts that sharing clinical test results is often a
necessary part of furthering scientific research.86 In Merz’s view, “There is no clear line to be
drawn between clinical testing and research testing, because the state of the art of genetic tests is
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such that much more clinical study is necessary to validate and extend the early discovery of a
disease gene. Thus, the restriction of physicians from performing clinical testing will directly
reduce the knowledge about these genes.”87 Though Myriad can argue that patents are necessary
to incentivize private investment in research, it cannot argue that enforcing its patents poses no
harm to research on clinical diagnostics.
By forcing university researchers and healthcare providers to abandon their work on
developing better clinical tests for patients, Myriad has stirred up the healthcare community and
raised serious doubts regarding the validity of its patents. On the other hand, biotechnology
industry experts have provided strong reasons against a complete ban on gene patents. Though
the anticommons theory is not an entirely new, its recent emergence with the expansion of gene
patentability makes one to wonder about its potential long-term consequences. The following
case study on the BRCA1/2 controversy will attempt to explore these dimensions of the gene
patent debate, and learn how they will affect the future of clinical diagnostics in the US.

The Myriad Case:
The patenting of BRCA1/2
The discovery of the BRCA1/2 genes was the cumulative result of research conducted by
scientists from around the world. The search for the first BRCA gene involved a fierce
competition between seven major research teams across five countries, and led to the creation of
the International Breast Cancer Linkage Consortium in 1988.88 Funding came from a large
number of sources, including public institutions such as the U.S. National Institutes of Health.
Two years later, a U.S. team led by Mary Claire King from the University of California at
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Berkeley announced the location of BRCA1 on chromosome 17.89 Needless to say, the scientific
community received the news with much enthusiasm.
However, it was a different research group – one led by Marc Skolnick at the University
of Utah’s Centre for Genetic Epidemiology – that ultimately acquired the patents for BRCA1.
Researchers seeking to patent the BRCA1 gene had to determine both the normal and mutated
sequences of the gene. Using a vast pedigree of Mormon families that he had recorded since the
1970s, Skolnick was able to trace the hereditary path of breast cancer by cross-linking the
pedigree with the Utah cancer registry.90 This study fueled the group’s future research, and with
$5 million from the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Myriad began to sequence mutations of
the BRCA1 gene.91 To secure more funds for the project in the meantime, Skolnick’s team
separated itself from the university’s genetic center and incorporated as Myriad Genetics in
1991.92 By promising the large pharmaceutical firm Eli Lilly licensing rights over diagnostic
kits and therapeutics developed from BRCA1, Myriad was able to raise $2.8 million ($1 million
in equity, $1.8 million in licensing royalties) from the firm even before it received any patents.93
In August of 1994, Myriad filed its first patent application over sequences for BRCA1 and its
mutations. After three years and multiple revisions from applicant, the USPTO granted Myriad
in December 1997 a patent covering 47 different mutations of the BRCA1 gene.94 In the next six
months, Myriad was issued seven additional patents on sequences of BRCA1 and diagnostic
methods used to test for the gene.95
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Interestingly, however, another US firm managed to get a patent for the normal BRCA1
sequence months before Myriad did. After licensing King’s research on BRCA1, Oncormed
filed for a patent on the “consensus sequence of the human BRCA1 gene” in February 1996 and
received a patent in August 1997.96 At first, Oncormed and Myriad sued each other for patent
infringement. In May 1998, however, Myriad bought Oncormed’s BRCA1/2 patents for an
“undisclosed” sum.97 Throughout the 1990s, Myriad persisted in consolidating patent rights over
both BRCA1 and BRCA2. In September 1994, a UK-based, multinational team led by Michael
Stratton became the first to announce the location of BRCA2. The team published the genetic
sequence by December 1995, and the Cancer Research Campaign (the charity fund supporting
the research) filed for a patent in the UK. Myriad, however, managed to file for a patent in the
US a day before the article was published. Claiming that its sequence was more complete than
Stratton’s, Myriad successfully applied for and received patents on the BRCA2 gene, its
mutations and the processes by which it would be detected.98
Given the number teams working on the discovery and sequencing of BRCA1/2, it is
unclear whether the patents granted to Myriad were necessary for the identification of the genes.
For BRCA1, it is clear that patents played an important role in attracting funding for research.
Both Oncormed and Myriad sequenced the genes in order to patent them. While the $5 million
from NIH funded much of Skolnick’s initial work, the private investments from Eli Lilly and
other prospective shareholders gave Myriad the additional boost it needed to complete its crosslinkage analysis. In the absence of a large nonprofit such as CRC, Myriad’s anticipated patents
on BRCA1 were critical to the firm’s ability to secure private funding. For BRCA2, however,
the Cancer Research Campaign (CRC) charity provided sufficient funding for Stratton’s team’s
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sequencing of the gene. Although the CRC sought to patent Stratton’s discovery, its intent was
to secure broad availability of the gene by preventing other entities from patenting and restricting
it.99 Thus, even if Myriad had not patented BRCA2, scientists would have been able to rely on
Stratton’s research to develop tests for it.
Questions also remain as to the appropriateness of the patents. By granting Oncormed
and Myriad patents concurrent on the same gene, the USPTO created a legal mess in which each
party sued the other for infringement.100 Although the issue was eventually settled out of court,
it raises questions regarding the original validity of patents issued by the USPTO. Furthermore,
the BRCA1/2 patents granted Myriad a broad monopoly over foundational discoveries first made
by Mary Clare King and Michael Stratton. When asked about the suspicious timing of Myriad’s
BRCA2 patent, Stratton stated that Myriad had capitalized on an information leak at his
workplace, the Institute of Cancer Research.101 According to one citation network analysis,
researchers around the world still tend to believe that Michael Stratton’s team was the first to
sequence BRCA2.102 In light of Stratton’s comments, the study suggests that the scientific
community is somewhat doubtful of the validity of Myriad’s claims to the BRCA2 sequence.
Although patent rights played a critical role as a financial incentive for startup firms such
as Myriad and strategic investors such as Eli Lilly, they were less of an incentive for the
researchers who directly contributed to the discovery of the genes. Both Stratton and King
intended to license their discoveries openly rather than restrict other researchers’ access to them,
and this reflected the general culture in the geneticist community against the aggressive use of
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patents on human DNA. Myriad, however, would block others from benefiting from its own
findings despite its heavy reliance on the work of others. Rather than license its genes to other
research teams that had developed their own diagnostic tests, Myriad would choose to kill
market competition by forcing researchers to shut down their labs and clearing their products out
of the market. Ultimately, the broad scope of the BRCA1/2 patents would undermine the
development of improved diagnostic techniques by preventing academic labs from applying
them in clinical studies. Given the limited role that the patents played in the discovery and
identification of the BRCA1/2 gene, it is difficult to argue that the utility initially generated by
the BRCA1/2 patents was enough to justify broad restrictions on subsequent research.

Business development and domestic concerns
Through its nine patents on BRCA1/2, Myriad consolidated its exclusive rights over all
applications involving the two genes.103 Although it claimed that its long-term goal was to
develop therapeutic treatments for breast cancer, the firm started by building a diagnostics
business based out its facilities in Utah. To launch its diagnostics business, Myriad built a $30
million laboratory104 and began to market the three subsets of its BRACAnalysis® test: the
comprehensive test ($2600 for complete sequence of BRCA1/2), the single site test ($295) and
the 3-mutation multisite test ($450 for mutations prevalent in the Ashkenazi Jewish
population).105 Patients who did not have relatives already tested for BRCA1/2 would receive
the comprehensive test, while the single site test would be given to relatives of patients for whom
a mutation was found. The logic of the system was that the relatives of patients testing positive
would only have to test for the mutation already discovered in family.
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Myriad sought to build its business by drawing together a large network of professionals,
providers and payors within the healthcare industry. It provided training for physicians and
clinicians, whom they relied on for patient referrals. The firm also made agreements with large
health management organizations such as Kaiser Permanente and Blue Cross/Blue Shield to
provide testing for their patients, and had its tests covered by over 390 insurers by 1999.106
Throughout this process, Myriad marketed its test as the “gold standard” for breast cancer
diagnostics.107 Laboratory tests were kept in-house, with the exception of follow-up single-site
tests that were sometimes licensed to local labs. The firm claimed that its method of full
sequencing was superior to other methods because it checked each individual nucleotide in the
BRCA code to specifically locate each point mutation.108
By the time Myriad settled its patent disputes, however, other methods had already
become commercially available. At the University of Pennsylvania, Dr. Arupa Ganguly at the
Genetics Diagnostics Laboratory (GDL) had created a faster, cheaper test that used gel
electrophoresis to detect mutations in the DNA.109 At the Genetics and IVF Institute (GIVF),
patients were given tests that used protein truncation testing (PTT) or single stranded
conformational polymorphism (SSCP) in addition to local DNA sequencing. Despite Myriad’s
claim that its sequencing method was the gold standard, PPT or SSCP had the added benefit of
detecting large re-arrangement and deletion mutations that weren’t always detected Myriad’s
sequencing method.110 To eliminate this potential source of competition, Myriad wrote ceaseand-desist letters to both GDL and GIVF in early 1998.111
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Although the first letter was enough to convince GIVF to quit its tests, GDL argued that
its tests fell under the common law research exemption. Because its clinical tests had been
restricted to subjects who were enrolled under the National Cancer Institute’s (NCI) Cancer
Genetics Network and its research protocols, GDL asserted that they were beyond the reach of
Myriad’s patents.112 Myriad disagreed, however, and maintained that GDL was providing a
commercial service as long as it disclosed the results of its tests to patients. It sent a total of four
letters, two to GDL co-Director Dr. Haig Kazazian and two to University of Pennsylvania
general counsel Robert Terrell, accusing the University and the GDL of patent infringement and
demanding written assurance that the testing would be stopped.113 To avoid a protracted lawsuit
for which it lacked the resources, GDL eventually abandoned its project. With GDL out of the
picture, Myriad reached a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the NCI that allowed it
to provide its testing services to NCI researchers and offer discounted prices only when they
were paid for in grant funds.114 This move allowed Myriad to expand its market share and draw
more revenue from public funds without reducing its revenue from private insurers and patients.
From a policy perspective, one of the more worrisome aspects of Myriad’s negotiations
with the GDL was that they resulted in Myriad determining the boundary between exempted
research and commercial infringement.115 The line between clinical research and commercial
diagnostic services is grey, fuzzy and difficult to determine, and allowing the patent-holder to
determine the boundary seems foolhardy at best. In the case of BRCA1/2, Myriad’s enforcement
of its patents impeded the provision of services critical for clinicians and their patients. With the
closure of Ganguly’s lab at the GDL, cancer-counseling clinics at New York University,
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Columbia University and Georgetown University stopped sending their samples to GDL and lost
the ability to pursue a second opinion other than Myriad’s.
Through its aggressive actions against the GDL, Myriad dissuaded other university labs
at Yale, Columbia, and Emory from providing their own full sequencing and large rearrangement
services for BRCA1/2 despite their capacity to do so immediately.116 This became a critical
problem for patients who received test results that had variants of unknown significance (VUS),
genetic mutations for which Myriad did not know if they were indicative of increased
susceptibility to cancer. According to Director Harry Ostrer at the NYU Langone Medical
Center (the main plaintiff in this case), Myriad’s monopoly on BRCA1/2 testing prevented him
and other researchers from studying the VUS to determine their meaning.117 Dr. Wendy Chung,
Director of Clinical Genetics at Columbia University, noted that as of 2005 a disproportionate
number of the 1,433 test results with VUS were from racial minorities (i.e. African Americans,
Asians and Hispanics) because of the limited data on patterns of genetic variation within
minority populations.118 Given the high price of Myriad’s testing services and the firm’s
decision to not accept Medicaid patients, Dr. Ostrer worried that Myriad might not see a
sufficient financial incentive in addressing the VUS predominant in patients from
underprivileged racial minority groups.119 Although university labs were ready to engage in
clinical research addressing the VUS in these patient populations, Myriad’s patents were
preventing them from doing so.
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By eliminating BRCA1/2 testing at university labs, Myriad’s aggressive actions also
raised civil rights concerns regarding patients’ access to their own genetic information. By
preventing clinicians from reporting test results to patients and allowing for the marginalization
of racial minorities due to disparate VUS rates, the firm’s practices violated the right to free
inquiry under the First Amendment and raised concerns regarding equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment. When Myriad stated that it did not seek to restrict research in any way,
it meant that Dr. Chung and other NCI researchers were allowed to sequence the BRCA1/2 gene
for their own use but forbidden to sequence it for patients. Because Myriad’s patents blocked
researchers from disseminating the pure information expressed in patients’ genes, they
undermined the right to free inquiry by preventing the transmission of knowledge and thought.
The patents also discouraged university investment in translational research critical to resolving
the VUS,120 including those that were found disproportionately in racial minorities. Patients of
color were placed at greater risk because Myriad’s BRACAnalysis® test results generated
unresolved VUS, and this raised concerns about racial inequality regarding access to accurate
testing. Myriad addressed the VUS issue by improving its test over time. In terms free inquiry,
however, it was clear that Myriad’s decision to prevent other labs from providing BRCA1/2
testing was violating the patient’s right to seek a second opinion.
By eliminating opportunities for second opinion testing, Myriad’s restriction of free
inquiry would place patients at greater risk of misdiagnosis. As mentioned earlier, the use of
large-rearrangement tests such as PPT helped other laboratories find structural mutations that
weren’t detected by Myriad’s sequencing test. Myriad, however, did not employ large
rearrangement testing until much later. In 2001, French researcher Dominique Stoppa-Lyonnet
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and her colleagues reported that they had found a previously undetected mutation in a French
family previously studied by Myriad.121 Meanwhile, Mary Clare King conducted a study of 300
high-risk women previously studied by Myriad and used alternative methods to identify
previously undetected BRCA mutations in 12% of those subjects.122 In light of these findings,
Myriad admitted that some large rearrangement mutations would escape detection by its original
test, and continued to work on an additional test that was eventually completed in 2006. The
firm has asserted that throughout this time, it did not seek to shut down other laboratories
offering alternative, individualized tests designed to catch these large rearrangements.123
The testimony of Genetic Counseling Director Ellen Matloff at the Yale Cancer Center
suggests otherwise. In her written statement to the Southern District Court of New York, Ms
Matloff noted that “Myriad’s continuous and systematic assertion of its BRCA patents [had]
resulted in the elimination of other genetic testing options available to [her] and [her] patients
that could [have been] cheaper, better and more appropriate.”124 As it had done with GDL,
Myriad sent a cease-and-desist letter to the Yale DNA Diagnostics lab in late 2000. The Yale
lab, which had previously offered Ms Matloff BRCA1/2 analysis at $1600, stopped its tests after
receiving the letter. In 2005, Ms Matloff requested Myriad’s permission for the Yale lab to test
her patients for the large rearrangements in the BRCA genes that Myriad’s test had missed.
Despite the fact that it did not yet provide such tests, Myriad denied the request. Ms Matloff ‘s
patients were thus denied access to alternative individualized tests that could have led to a better
outcome. Although Myriad eventually released its own version of the test (the BART®) later
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on, it charged an additional $650125 premium that most insurers were not willing to pay. Because
many nationwide insurers have chosen not to bear the additional cost of covering Myriad’s
BART®, patients are left with no choice but to bear the full burden of the cost or forgo the test.
Ms Matloff notes that were it not for Myriad’s threat to sue, other laboratories would have been
able to provide these tests earlier and at a much lower price.126
Given this evidence regarding Myriad’s business practices in the US, it is difficult to
deny that the broad scope of Myriad’s BRCA patents led to restrictions on clinical researchers’
access to the BRCA genes, and cost some patients the opportunity for earlier and more accurate
detection. Though Myriad insists that it never blocked the research use of its BRCA patents, this
claim implies a rather narrow definition of “research” that excludes much of the clinical testing
that university labs attempted to do. According to Director David Ledbetter at the Emory
Medical School’s Division of Medical Genetics, “sequencing will only cover 70% of the
causative mutations” linked with breast cancer but “structure causes 30%.”127 Despite the fact
that nonprofit labs in multiple universities had the ability to test for the additional 30% and find
the cases of hereditary breast cancer that Myriad missed, Myriad used its patents to prevent the
provision of such tests. Meanwhile, those patients who ultimately bore the cost of this decision
lost the opportunity for early diagnosis and an improved chance of survival.
In light of these issues, Myriad came across to many researchers as a firm that was
determined to maximize its profits even at the cost of scientific inquiry and patient health.
Although the firm’s decisions were reasonable and perhaps even necessary in terms of protecting
its profits and its shareholders’ interests, the human cost imposed by the restrictions on
university clinics intensified the firm’s clash with patients and medical professionals. As Myriad
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built a reputation for its aggressive business strategy, it eventually triggered hostile reactions
from abroad as well.

Global expansion and reactions abroad
With its business growing in the United States, Myriad attempted to expand its global
market share by acquiring patent rights abroad. The firm was at first successful in obtaining
patents in Canada, Europe, Australia, New Zealand and Japan.128 In order to sell its product,
Myriad selected a licensee for each region and gave it the exclusive right to market all BRCA
tests in that region. As it had done in the states, it usually allowed licensees conduct the followon tests while keeping all comprehensive testing in its main laboratory in Utah.129 Due to
opposition within the countries’ healthcare systems, however, this business model met with
limited success. Both in Europe and in Canada, Myriad’s patents eventually met with staunch
opposition from healthcare professionals, policymakers and patients who believed that the broad
scope of Myriad’s patents was not aligned with their goals.
Passed in 1998, the European Union (EU) Directive 98/44 on the Legal Protection of
Biotechnological Inventions required EU member states to enact laws permitting patents on
human genes by 2000. Most states, however, did not enact such legislation until several years
after the deadline.130 When the European Patent Office (EPO) issued Myriad its patents on
BRCA1/2 in 2001, France had yet to provide a statutory protection for patents on human genes.
The delay reflected the French scientific community’s wariness towards such patents, and was
prolonged by opposition from researchers such as Stoppa-Lyonnet who had stood against
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Myriad’s aggressive use of its patents. Thus, when Myriad offered to license its test to the
Institut Curie (a leading French non-profit research foundation) and researchers at other French
laboratories, it did not receive a response. Instead, it faced opposition from the Institut Curie and
16 other French laboratories against its patents through the Opposition Division at the EPO.131
There were both political and scientific motives behind the specific strategy taken against
Myriad. From a political standpoint, the French Ministries of Health and Research expected that
the opposition procedure at the EPO would strengthen the government’s bargaining position
against Myriad while allowing the government to refrain from a direct declaration against gene
patents.132 By providing public support for the Institut Curie’s challenge but avoiding direct
participation, the ministry officials hoped to negotiate a licensing agreement more in favor of
French laboratories while keeping the policy window open for fulfillment of EU Directive 98/44.
If there were no window, there would be no credible argument for Myriad to license in France
all. If Myriad were to license its rights in France, the government would at least have the
opportunity to try broadening access to the patented genes by extending compulsory licenses in
the name of public health.
Institut Curie, however, had independently grounded reasons to challenge the patents.
Whereas the Ministries ultimately pursued a policy that would acknowledge Myriad’s patents,
the Institut and other French labs were opposed to adhering to them at all.133 Specifically,
researchers such as Stoppa-Lyonnet were concerned that Myriad’s testing protocols would
ultimately detect fewer BRCA mutations despite charging a higher price. As mentioned earlier,
research done by French labs had suggested that a significant portion of testable BRCA
mutations were going undetected by Myriad’s test. As with the case of the Yale DNA
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Diagnostics lab, Institut Curie feared that it would no longer be able to provide its own test,
which it claimed was better than Myriad’s test because the former provided the large
rearrangement testing yet missing in Myriad’s methods. Furthermore, it warned that Myriad’s
insistence on keeping tissue samples for all comprehensive BRACAnalysis® tests back in Utah
would prevent French researchers from building their own database for BRCA mutations.134
Institut Curie’s challenge against Myriad’s patents soon drew support from groups in a
number of other European countries. Genetics societies and patients’ associations from
Germany, the United Kingdom, Austria, Switzerland and other countries joined in the opposition
against Myriad, further motivated by the concerns over the firm’s alleged failure to provide
adequate counseling and follow-up care for patients.135 Myriad attempted to reach an agreement
with the French Ministry of Health, but the Ministry failed to continue negotiations after a power
change in the June 2002 national elections.136 Left to the decision of the EPO, Myriad’s initial
patents were significantly reduced. The Opposition Division of the ECJ affirmed that, based on
the European Patent Convention, Myriad’s patent (EP 705 902) could not claim the isolated
BRCA1 gene or use it to prevent others from developing diagnostics for it.137
Subsequent responses in individual European countries also led to more restrictive
policies on gene patents. Belgium enacted a research exemption as a direct answer to the public
debate stirred by Myriad’s patents.138 Germany passed legislation in 2005 that removed absolute
substance protection and protected new applications of patented genes from infringement
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lawsuits.139 In France, a new amendment in 2004 enabled the government to issue compulsory
licenses on patented diagnostics.140 While the exemption and specificity requirements used by
these countries fell short of rejecting gene patents outright, they clearly represented a step back
from an absolute guarantee of broad patent rights over genes.
In Canada, policymakers also moved to curtail Myriad’s patent-backed monopoly.
Because provincial governments were largely in charge of directing Canada’s public payer
healthcare system, opposition originated at the provincial level. In 2000, Myriad reached a
marketing agreement with MDS Laboratory Services in Canada and began to offer its testing
services to health officials in the provinces. As it had proposed in Europe, Myriad wanted to
keep laboratory testing in-house rather than provide the diagnostic kits. This was new to
Ontario’s provincial healthcare system, which usually relied on diagnostic kits that let hospitals
provide the tests themselves.141 Hospitals in Canada were already providing their own BRCA
tests to patients on a research basis, and by April 2000 these tests were fully covered under
public health insurance.142 Cognizant of the resistance that Myriad’s business model had faced
in Europe, the Ontario Health Ministry and the other provinces’ health ministries chose to
consult first with various researchers and laboratories and delayed their response to Myriad.143
By the spring of 2001, MDS and Myriad had yet to receive an answer. Tired of waiting
for the Ministry’s response, Myriad sent cease-and-desist letters to the authorities in Ontario,
Alberta, Quebec, and British Columbia, insisting that any “funding, directing or contracting with
others to perform genetic testing services” would be in infringement of exclusively licensed
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patents and subject to litigation.144 The wording was used to extend the infringement charge to
not just the hospitals performing the test, but to the provincial governments that paid for them as
well. Threatened with legal action, Ontario Premier Mike Harris and Health Minister Tony
Clement asserted that the public payments made to Ontario hospitals for their BRCA tests were
not in infringement of Myriad’s patents.145 As for the hospital clinics, Harris and Clement
determined that the health needs of Canadian women justified their decision to provide
BRCA1/2 testing. Although the average cost of a BRCA1/2 test in Ontario was $1150, Myriad
demanded $3850 for each test.146 According to spokesperson Gord Haugh, the Ontario health
ministry decided that adhering to Myriad’s demands would have set an insupportable
precedent.147
When attempted negotiations between the Minister Tony Clement, MDS and Myriad fell
apart (Myriad presented a letter from the US ambassador threatening trade sanctions), the
Ontario government approached the federal Patent Policy Directorate. The Directorate, however,
attempted to avoid the issue and demanded that Ontario provide more substantial evidence of a
real and present crisis.148 The Directorate’s failure to facilitate a workable settlement between
Myriad and the provinces led to further deterioration of relations between the two sides. In
British Columbia, authorities attempted to comply with Myriad’s patents by stopping tests at the
B.C. Cancer Agency, but ultimately failed. Under Myriad’s prices, patients faced a price hike
that the public health insurance system could not afford to pay.149 Methods to work around
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Myriad’s patents were unsatisfactory, and in 2003 the BC Ministry of Health Services allowed
the BCCA to reengage in testing for BRCA mutations.150
In the end, Myriad was unable to enforce its patents in Canada because of two main
reasons: 1. conflicts between its business strategy and the publicly funded provincial healthcare
systems and 2. a lack of policy coordination in the Canadian government at the federal level.
Federal action was delayed due to disagreements between Health Canada (the national health
department) and the Patent Policy Directorate, and the latter’s decision to not intervene. In 2004,
Health Canada and the Directorate asked the Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee
(CBAC) for its recommendation on the issue.151 Although CBAC has suggested the
implementation of a narrowly tailored research exemption, Canada has yet to clarify its official
policy.152 Myriad, meanwhile, has abandoned its attempts at market exclusivity in the country.
The challenges that Myriad faced in Europe and Canada were again due to the clash of
interests between the firm and healthcare professionals, but with a greater emphasis this time on
the role of clinical research in the national healthcare agenda. In Canada, France and many other
European nations, health insurance was socialized and public spending comprised as larger share
of national healthcare expenditure. As a result, the debate over Myriad’s gene patents focused
on the fact that they would prevent public and nonprofit cancer research clinics from developing
tests that would improve patient access to critical health-related information. On the other hand,
political decision-making (and a lack thereof) also played a critical role in determining the
outcome of the conflicts in France and Canada. Ministry officials’ decisions to not engage in
proactive dialogue with Myriad encouraged it to take more unilateral actions, which were
interpreted as a sign of aggressiveness and hostility. Although some delay was necessary for
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policymakers to gather information and insight from various researchers and clinicians, some
policymakers (e.g. at Canada’s Patent Policy Directorate) may have used the lack of empirical
evidence as an excuse to avoid the responsibility of articulating a specific policy framework for
regulating the patents.153 Altogether, these reactions had the effect of antagonizing Myriad’s
breast cancer testing business, and intensifying the clash between the firm’s patents and clinical
research around the world.

Lessons from Myriad
What does the story of the BRCA1/2 patents tell us about patent policy toward human
genes? At a most basic level, it points to the need for a better articulation of policy goals. In
light of the issues that arose from the patenting of the genes and their monopolization in the
clinical diagnostics space, it is clear that there are pressing reasons to limit the enforceability of
patents on human DNA. Allowing patents to restrict genetic research and product development
can lead to outcomes that are seriously detrimental to the innovation and progress, and can bear a
negative impact on the health of thousands of patients each year.
Myriad’s interaction with other research clinics, clearly demonstrated the extent to which
gene patents could violate the obligations of medical professionals, the rights of patients and the
goals of healthcare systems. At the University of Pennsylvania, Institut Curie and the Ontario
hospital system, physicians involved in BRCA1/2 clinical research had an ethical duty to reveal
the test result to the patient when asked. Given this issue mentioned earlier by Merz and Cho,
Myriad’s assertion that it supported the research use of BRCA1/2 was inconsistent with its
practice of preventing research clinics from sharing test results. Its attempt to draw a “very
bright line” failed to achieve its purported dual goal of promoting research while punishing
153
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infringers. By directly and indirectly forcing the closure of in-house BRCA1/2 testing labs at
U.S. universities and hospitals in British Columbia, Myriad preventing physician-run
laboratories from providing second opinion testing and new tests that it did not yet cover. For all
hereditary breast cancer patients and particularly for those from economically underprivileged
racial minority groups, Myriad’s business model seems to have been neither clinically sound nor
ethically justifiable.
On a separate note, the Myriad story also suggests that governments seeking investment
in biomedical technology should narrow their patent policies to a range that is more in line with
their healthcare policy goals. While it seems that Myriad’s aggressive actions against infringers
may have been partly to blame for its mixed success abroad, it is also true that government
officials in both France and Canada exacerbated the conflicts by failing to communicate clear
restrictions to patent enforcement in a timely and credible manner. Both France and Canada had
expansive patent policies that were not in line with their more socialized healthcare systems.
Instead of guaranteeing Myriad limited exclusivity rights in exchange for specific concessions in
its enforcement practices (e.g., full exclusivity over the distribution of its own testing kits in
exchange for a liability exemption protecting preexisting tests in public hospitals),
government officials in France and Ontario failed to address the uncertainty over the practical
level of protection that could be afforded to Myriad’s patents. As a result, Myriad chose to
enforce its patents aggressively and ended up in protracted lawsuits that hurt its growth. This
increased uncertainty weakens intellectual property rights by undermining their potential value
as “live capital” – as effective incentives for private investment. To incentivize further private
investment in genetic diagnostics, governments will have to establish patent policies as social
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policies that they can expect to enforce. In the US, Congress will have to decide where the
pragmatic balance between incentives and access should lie.
While it is true that healthcare in the US is less socialized than those of France or Canada,
our nation’s more privatized model also requires the greater regulation of patents on human
genes. The story behind the BRCA1/2 patent controversy shows that in clinical testing, gene
patents’ harmful effects on market competition can outweigh their potential benefits as
incentives for investment. From a fiscal standpoint, these patents go against the goal of the
Bayh-Dole Act and fail to align with the purpose of NIH funding. From an efficiency
standpoint, the patents undermine the federal goal of containing costs through improved
technology. In the US today, the high cost of care for chronic conditions such as cancer skew
national healthcare expenditure so that the most chronically ill 1% of all patients require 20% of
total national spending. By helping potential cancer victims avoid more expensive treatments,
reduce the risk of tumor recurrence and take advantage of available preventive measures, timely
and accessible clinical diagnostics could significantly reduce their total cost of care.154 Given
that national health expenditures are expected to reach 32% of GDP within the next twenty
years,155 the fiscal and economic considerations provide strong justification for patent policy
reforms supporting better genetic testing.
By halting the development of new tests at university labs and preventing second opinion
testing, Myriad BRCA1/2 patents undermined the scientific inquiry that they were supposed to
promote. Despite the Bayh-Dole Act’s original goal of promoting innovation through patents on
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university research, the BRCA1/2 patents led to the aggressive stifling of innovation in clinical
testing at university laboratories. This raised critical policy questions tied to the promotion of
both clinical science and fundamental civil rights. In light of these issues, researchers and
advocates in the have called upon the Department of Health and Human Services to pursue a
statutory liability infringement exemption on the research and diagnostic uses of patented genetic
sequences.

The SACGHS Report:
Suggestions for US policy
To address the gene-patenting dilemma from the healthcare policy perspective, the U.S.
Health and Human Services Department (HHS) commissioned a fact-finding task force from the
Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health and Society (SACGHS) to determine the
impact of gene patents on clinical diagnostics development and patient access to gene testing.
From October 2006 to September 2009, the SACGHS task force collected evidence through an
extensive literature review and a compendium of case studies for 10 clinical conditions.156 In
March 2010, the committee reported that patents on genetic discoveries “do not appear to be
necessary for either basic genetic research or the development of available genetic tests.”157
Citing the American College of Medical Genetics, the report reaffirmed that “genetic tests are
typically well developed and being delivered BEFORE patent holders seek to control the
testing.”158 While noting university technology managers’ and biotechnology firms’ assertions
that gene patents have acted as a significant incentive for funding from outside investors, the
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report also noted that exclusive licensing and the high transaction costs for licensing these
patents have created significant hurdles in the treatment of rare hereditary disorders.159
In addition to the BRCA1/2 test, the report included case studies on the development of
clinical diagnostics for hereditary hearing loss, spinocerebellar ataxias, Long QT Syndrome,
Canavan disease and hereditary hemochromatosis. In all of these cases, clinical gene tests were
available on the market before the gene patent holder offered its own. These studies showed that
other diagnostic companies (e.g. Athena Diagnostics, PGxHealth) “[had] adopted similar or even
more aggressive business models and [had] shut out university laboratories from offering genetic
testing for [the hereditary] diseases.” 160 By clearing the market of these preexisting tests, gene
patents were limiting the availability of current tests, preventing competitors from improving the
tests and blocking qualified physicians from providing valuable second opinions to patients
whose test results were unclear.
Of course, incentivizing investment in genetic discoveries is not the sole reason given for
issuing patents. Proponents of gene patents have argued that without patents, academic
geneticists would resort to trade secrecy rather than promote open science. According to the
SACGHS report, however, this argument misses the point: the primary goal for researchers is to
get published, and in order to win recognition they must reveal their findings as early as possible.
Reverse engineering also reduces the viability of trade secrecy as an effective competitive
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strategy.161 Given this environment, the report suggests that trade secrecy in the absence of
patents is neither preferable nor practical for genetic researchers as a substitute for patents.
While patents might allow and encourage the disclosure of some information while providing
proprietary rights, trade secrecy prevents researchers from pursuing prizes for their findings and
often fails to exclude others from engineering substitute versions of their inventions.
While emphasizing that there are incentives for disclosure other than patent rights, the
report goes on to note that patents may even fail to promote disclosure and end up reducing
public knowledge. According to the Innovation Partnership, a nonprofit IP consultancy, “The
argument that patents promote progress through the required disclosure of the new invention is
not substantiated by empirical evidence. [Patent specifications are] drafted as broadly as
possible while disclosing little. Most scientists admit they rarely consult patents to identify
useful information.”162 One major study showed that gene patents could even have a dampening
effect on the proliferation of scientific publications about their claimed gene. In 2009, Kenneth
Huang and Fiona Murray published a study tracing the effects of patents on follow-on research
about their respectively claimed genes. Using a mathematical model in which “public citations
to each paper” acted as a proxy for follow-on research, they studied 1,279 papers and measured
their respective citations.163 The results showed that the number of citations was on average 5%
lower than predicted for papers that were published jointly with a gene patent, and almost 10%
lower when the patented gene indicated a hereditary predisposition for a human disease.164
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In its six recommendations to HHS Secretary Sebelius,165 the SACGHS highlighted the
need to create exemptions from infringement liability for researchers and providers of clinical
diagnostics.166 The committee argued that while improving access and quality in genetic testing,
this exemption would allow firms to continue seeking gene patents and enforce them in the
development of therapeutics. Notably, the committee also recommended that HHS “ensure equal
access to clinically useful genetic tests” in light of the fact that they “will be increasingly
incorporated into medical care.” By establishing equity as a key issue in this debate, the
committee echoed the VUS concerns in the Myriad debate and highlighted the systemic
discrimination that could emerge in the clinical diagnostics space due to the business strategies
and pricing practices of a sole provider.

Dissent and rebuttal
Some members of the SACGHS, however, disagreed with the recommendations that
were published in the committee report and attached a statement of dissent. Emphasizing the
investor’s desire to secure a sufficient return on investment, the statement claimed that the
creation of an exemption would endanger the pursuit and development of many discoveries due
to the “increasing complexity” and “higher evidentiary standards” involved in developing
genetic tests. Regarding the issue of pricing and equitable access, the dissenters argued that
health plans were “free to refuse coverage and payment even if every laboratory in the country
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offers a test,” and that equitable access to clinical testing was “a commercial objective more than
a patient access issue” because clinicians could already order tests from patent-holding
providers. Perhaps most tellingly, the dissenters did not believe that there was “any credible
evidence that the quality of testing performed in sole source laboratories is routinely or
demonstrably subpar in any way to what which is done in multiple laboratories”167 and refused to
believe that “modifying the gene patent system and protections it offers through exclusive
licensee agreements would result in multiple laboratories performing proprietary tests with better
quality than generated by current and developing oversight of quality assurance undertaken by
these agencies and laboratories themselves.”168
Barring a complete rejection of the numerous studies and testimonies provided by the
researchers, health providers and patients involved in the Myriad case, the latter statements made
by the dissenting statement to the SACGHS report appear questionable at best. The declarations
of Ms Matloff, Dr. Ostrer and Dr. Ledbetter, the research of Mary Clare King and Dominique
Stoppa-Lyonnet, and the personal experience of those patients who bore the social cost of
Myriad’s restrictive practices provide at least a credible case with demonstrable evidence of the
adverse effects of patent-backed monopolies on clinical testing for heritable diseases. In the
ACLU’s current public education campaign regarding gene patents, Ms Kathleen Maxian shares
her experience of suffering from advanced-stage ovarian cancer due to a BRCA1/2 mutation in
her family that Myriad’s tests failed to catch. Myriad’s “comprehensive” BRACAnalysis® test
had failed to detect the mutation in her sister, which if detected would have allowed Ms Maxian
to seek preventive measures in the earlier stages of her condition (and improve her chances for
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survival). The company’s pricing policies and guidelines had withheld complementary BART®
testing from Ms Maxian’s sister.
Of course, it would be hyperbolic to declare that Myriad’s patents should be revoked
because of a single incident. It would also be unfair to expect Myriad to provide free testing for
all patients – the firm states on its website that less than 1% of patients on average will test
positive in BART® after testing negative in BRACAnalysis®.169 It would be wrong, however,
to claim that Myriad did right by preventing Ms Matloff from providing large rearrangement
testing to patients who could not get it through Myriad. Patients in situations similar to that of
Ms Maxian were restricted to Myriad’s linear method of sequencing despite the fact that the Yale
center was willing and able to provide the large rearrangement test that captured mutations left
undetected by Myriad’s BRACAnalysis®. This was clearly a patient’s rights issue – a matter of
civil rights and human decency, not merely of patent rights and commercial gain.
The dissent’s implicit claim that gene patent holders are not culpable for high prices and
limited access because insurers are “free to refuse” is also rather weak. It is true that many
insurers have chosen not to cover BART® testing, perhaps because Myriad has so far refused to
incorporate it into its purportedly “comprehensive” BRACAnalysis® sequencing test. Large
insurers such as Kaiser Permanente, however, have expressed their desire to increase access to
BRCA1/2 testing for all patients who might benefit from it. In fact, Kaiser would even lower
costs by providing these services in-house. According to Senior Vice President Dr. Jed
Weissberg, if it were not for Myriad’s patents on the isolated BRCA1/2 fragments, Kaiser
Permanente would be able to launch a nationwide BRCA1/2 testing program within months.170
This January, Kaiser followed up in the Myriad case by filing an amicus brief in support of the
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ACLU’s petition to the Supreme Court. Arguing on behalf of the plaintiff, the brief noted that
Myriad’s pricing system often makes it prohibitively difficult for Kaiser’s genetic counselors to
get tests for relatives of patients outside the Kaiser system. This is a critical issue when the
patient has a misleadingly low individual risk but a higher familial risk, and increases the chance
that the patient will suffer from a failed detection similar to the one that affected Ms Maxian and
her sister. Kaiser asserted that Myriad’s monopoly over BRCA1/2 testing is making it
“practically impossible” acquire complete familial information regarding BRCA1/2. Mentioning
Myriad’s test for colorectal cancer, it argued that there are critical benefits to be gained from
having multiple providers and a wider range of testing options. Affirming that it would provide
its own BRCA1/2 screening internally in the hypothetical absence of Myriad’s patents, Kaiser
declared that it could conduct BRCA1/2 diagnostics in a way that would be more appropriate and
patient specific than Myriad’s fixed menu of services.171
Perhaps the most defensible argument made by the dissenting members of the SACGHS
is that the infringement liability exemption on gene patents would reduce the incentive for
private investors to fund the development of new genetic tests. Even this, however, is a
disputable claim. Though the statement seems sound at first, this claim fails to address the
possibility that private investors may be driven to new genetic tests that do not rely gene patents
such as those owned by Myriad. With the major advancements made in the past decade towards
next generation, genomic scale sequencing technologies such as whole genome and whole
exome172 sequencing, patents on isolated fragments of DNA have become less relevant as a
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means of securing revenue streams. For currently available methods such as whole exome and
micro-array testing, they have even become a legal hindrance. Genetic diagnostics
manufacturers such as Illumina, Life Technologies and Pacific Biosciences pursue revenue
streams from high-throughput processing technology rather than economic rents on patented
DNA sequences. Market competition encourages them to lower the cost of sequencing on a per
amplicon basis,173 and the cost of sequencing an entire human genome has fallen (in light of
recent academic findings) from over $10,000 to just $1,000174 - over $2000 cheaper than
Myriad’s BRACAnalysis®.
When asked whether the advent of genomic scale sequencing would create downward
pressure on Myriad’s revenue, Mark Capone, president of Myriad’s laboratory division, argued
that data analysis costs are still too high and that these technologies will not be accurate enough
to be used in a clinical setting for at least the next four years.175 Consulting firm DeciBio,
however, expects that the currently dormant market for next generation sequencing will grow to
somewhere between $700 million and $1.1 billion by 2015.176 Meanwhile, universities across the
nation are working with a $416 million grant from the US National Genome Research Institute
(USNHGRI) to develop more effective methods of analysis and translate basic research into
genomic medicine.177 Given the unsustainably high price of Myriad’s $3,000+ BRACAnalysis®
test (plus an additional $700 for BART®) and the rapid advance of genomic scale sequencing,
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Goldman Sachs issued a sell rating on Myriad’s shares last year.178 Although other equity
research analysts may remain positive about the company’s prospects, there are strong signals in
both the market and academia suggesting that the future for investors will be in patented
sequencing technology, not patented genes.
While it does not provide a political strategy for implementing its recommended liability
exemption, the SACGHS report helps clarify many of the arguments made for and against
exemption regulations for gene patents in clinical testing. Myriad’s patents on isolated
fragments of the BRCA1/2 sequence may be responsible for 88% of its current revenue,179 but
they represent an outdated mindset that is reminiscent of the EST and SNP race of the 1990s. By
pursuing a business strategy built around the extraction of rents on the use of new upstream
research, companies such as Myriad, Incyte and Human Genomic Sciences adopted genepatenting practices that reduce patient access to timely care and threaten the development of
downstream products.
Although de facto arrangements between universities and firms have been sufficient to
prevent the rise of a widespread anticommons in genetic research, the development and use of
clinical diagnostic methods such as genomic scale sequencing and micro-array analysis raises the
issue of impeded downstream innovation yet again.180 Although the BRCA1/2 controversy may
seem to be an outlier due to the particularly vocal opposition from the breast and ovarian cancer
community, the SACGHS case studies show that it is not the only case of aggressively enforced
gene patents contributing to adverse public health results. Aggressively enforced gene patents
could prevent researchers from using whole exome and micro-array tests to look for the claimed
178
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genes. Given these concerns, it seems highly advisable that Congress and the courts at least
consider the possibility of invoking an infringement liability exemption for clinical genetic
testing. In the meantime, the courts will continue to debate the question of whether human genes
should be patentable at all.

In the Courts - the “dual nature” of DNA:
Despite the AMP’s 2-1 loss at the CAFC in July, recent developments at the Supreme
Court suggest that this debate is far from over. On March 26, 2012, the Supreme Court granted
the ACLU petition. It vacated the CAFC’s judgment upholding Myriad’s patents on isolated
DNA, and remanded the case for further consideration in light of the Court’s recent ruling in
Mayo et al. v. Prometheus. In Prometheus, the Supreme Court unanimously revoked
Prometheus’ blood test patents under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because they claimed processes failed to
deliver significant utility beyond the laws of nature.181 The test determined the correct dosage for
a drug by measuring changes in blood metabolite levels after the administration of different
doses, and the patents claimed the idea of inferring the correct dosage by correlating the
metabolite levels with their respective dosages. According to the court, the patents covering the
test methods failed to assure that they were “genuine applications of laws,” rather than “drafting
efforts designed to monopolize [laws of nature].”182 The act of removing and analyzing the
blood did not constitute a patentable step, because it did not add significant utility beyond a
restatement of natural phenomena.183
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While the ACLU intimates that this decision “bodes well for the ultimate outcome of the
Myriad case,"184 Myriad claims that the ultimate impact of the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Prometheus will be of little to no significance. In the words of Gregory Castanias, a lawyer
representing the firm, “We don’t believe that that decision really changes the landscape with
regard to our case at all.”185 Although the plaintiffs in both Myriad and Prometheus have argued
that the respective patents in question claim laws of nature, Myriad differs from Prometheus in
that Myriad focuses on ‘composition of matter’ patents rather than method patents. As Dr.
Robert Cook-Deegan from the former SACGHS task force puts it, the remaining debate in
Myriad is “about a thing rather than a method.”186 Almost all of Myriad’s method patents were
revoked by the July CAFC decision, on the basis that comparing two DNA sequences in order to
determine a BRCA1/2 mutation is an abstract idea that cannot be patented.187 Myriad’s
‘composition of matter’ patents on the isolated DNA, however, are valid according to CAFC
because these physical fragments are allegedly of a “markedly different chemical nature.”188 The
plaintiffs in Myriad have argued that these fragments are still essentially products of nature.
Although Supreme Court has remanded Myriad in light of the Prometheus ruling, it has not yet
explicitly affirmed the plaintiffs’ view.
The conflicting interpretations held by Myriad and the ACLU regarding the Supreme
Court’s latest decision ultimately reflect an issue of semantics that emerges from the “dual
nature” of DNA. As noted by Myriad Genetics’ Dr. Joseph Straus during the district court
184
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hearing of this case, “On the one hand, [isolated DNA] are chemical substances or molecules.
On the other hand, they are physical carriers of information, i.e., where the actual biological
function of this information is coding for proteins.” 189 The CAFC decision holds that isolated
DNA fragments become distinct when the researcher breaks the covalent bonds connecting them
to the rest of the subject’s genome.190 The issue with this claim is that the physical isolation of a
segment of the human genome does not change the information it contains. As Dr. Robert
Nussbaum from UC San Francisco explains it, the information contained in a gene is found in
the arrangement of the nucleotide bases in the DNA, and this sequence does not change whether
the DNA is in the body or in a test tube. Isolating the DNA does not make it “structurally and
functionally distinct,” and “to claim otherwise is to confuse a gene with the machinery that
regulates how that gene is expressed.”191 Myriad’s patents allow the firm to monopolize the
extraction of a person’s genetic information but fails add significant utility beyond the laws of
nature. Presumably, the plaintiff will argue that this violates the Supreme Court’s ruling that
mere “drafting efforts designed to monopolize” are unpatentable.
The issue before the CAFC, then, is whether the removal of a naturally occurring DNA
fragment from its cellular environment is sufficient to make the entire entity patentable as per 35
U.S.C. §101. Interestingly, the judges’ opinions in the July CAFC ruling reflect a rather mixed
stance towards this view. In the CAFC’s 2-1 ruling against the plaintiffs in July, the two judges
in the majority fail to articulate a common standard for identifying patentable discoveries. While
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Judges Alan Lourie and Kimberly Moore both agree that isolated DNA fragments have chemical
characteristics that are “markedly different” from those of naturally occurring DNA, they differ
in their explanations of why isolated DNA should be a patentable product. According to the
official majority decision written by Judge Lourie, Myriad’s claims are “drawn to patentable
subject matter” because they are on molecules that have “a distinctive chemical identity…from
molecules that exist in nature.”192 Judge Moore, however, writes a separate, concurring decision
to emphasize that the claims must also have “the potential for significant utility.”193
Although this split in reasoning seems rather subtle at first, this difference highlights the
conflict between the two judges’ views on the nature of DNA. By focusing exclusively on the
chemical identity of isolated DNA, Judge Lourie argues that isolation itself is a sufficient
condition for patentability. In his view, “It is the distinctive nature of DNA molecules as isolated
compositions of matter that determines their patent eligibility, rather than their physiological use
or benefit.”194 He insists that the “claimed isolated DNA molecules are distinct from their
natural existence,” and that “their informational content is irrelevant to that fact.” In conclusion,
Judge Lourie asserts that “the patent eligibility of an isolated DNA is not negated because it has
similar informational properties to a different, more complex natural material,” and that genes
are “best described in patents by their structures rather than their functions.”195
While concurring with Judge Lourie’s claim that isolated DNA is not a product of nature,
Judge Moore asserts that this alone does not “make isolated DNA so ‘markedly different’ from
chromosomal DNA so as to be per se patentable subject matter.”196 Unlike Judge Lourie, she
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attempts to address the plaintiff’s argument regarding utility by arguing that the isolation of
naturally occurring DNA fragments sufficiently increases their functional utility as well. She
argues that the process of extraction, the use of short fragments as primers and the development
of diagnostic tests are all non-natural interventions that add utility to both the chemical and
informational component of isolated DNA fragments.197 The difference between her logic and
Judge Laurie’s reasoning becomes most apparent in her discussion of isolated DNA fragments
that are too large to be used as primers, in which she states, “ Whether an isolated gene is
patentable subject matter depends on how much weight is allocated to the different structure as
compared to the similarity of the function to nature.”198
The significance of this split in reasoning between Judges Laurie and Moore is that the
latter’s argument may be more amenable to change in light of the Supreme Court’s Prometheus
ruling. Judge Moore’s logic – unlike Judge Laurie’s – allows for a calibration of patent policy
towards isolated DNA.199 Whereas Judge Laurie’s reasoning provides a blanket defense for the
patentability of any strand of isolated DNA because of its altered ends, Judge Moore’s inclusion
of functional utility in her determination of patentability acknowledges the possibility that “the
patents in this case might well deserve to be excluded from the patent system.”200 The Supreme
Court’s decision to vacate Judge Laurie’s ruling may lead Judge Moore to reassess whether the
incremental utility generated by Myriad’s patents goes sufficiently beyond the laws of nature that
provide DNA with its informational utility. Along with Judge Bryson’s dissenting view that
“isolated genes are not materially different from the native genes” because “the only material
change made to those genes from their natural state is the change that is necessarily incidental to
197
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the extraction of the genes,” Judge Moore’s reasoning balances the CAFC ruling more evenly
than a strict 2-1 division.
According to ACLU lawyer Chris Hansen, the plaintiffs in the CAFC case did not lose 2
to 1, but lost “1.51 to 1.49.”201 Aside from Judge Moore’s ruling and the Supreme Court’s
granting of certiorari, the ACLU’s odds in the upcoming CAFC rehearing may also benefit from
the support of the US Department of Justice (DOJ) and the past Solicitor General. Leading up to
the July hearing at the CAFC, the DOJ filed one of the 29 amicus briefs issued in response to the
ACLU lawsuit. Although the DOJ brief is technically “in support of neither party,”202 it
undermines the defendant’s claims to the BRCA1/2 genes by stating that “genomic DNA that has
merely been isolated from the human body, without further alteration or manipulation, is not
patent-eligible.”203 As an amicus, the DOJ attempts to set a future standard by which the
patentability of a particular genetic discovery could be determined based on its novelty and the
informational utility it generates. At a most basic level, this standard is built on the premise that
fragments of naturally occurring genomic DNA (gDNA) are products of nature but novel
sequences of complementary DNA (cDNA) are patentable inventions. According to the brief:
“New and useful methods of identifying, isolating, extracting, or using genes and
genetic information may be patented…as may nearly any man-made
transformation or manipulation of the raw materials of the genome, such as
cDNAs. Thus, the patent laws embrace gene replacement therapies, engineered
biologic drugs, methods of modifying the properties of plants or generating
biofuels, and similar advanced applications of biotechnology.”204
At the CAFC oral argument session in April, then-acting-Solicitor General Neal Katyal
explained the government’s position against patents based on the mere isolation of naturally
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occurring sequences of DNA. In asserting that the isolated DNA coding for the BRCA1
polypeptide205 falls outside the scope of §101, Katyal argued that isolated DNA is not patentable
if it codes for a sequence that is naturally present in the human chromosome.206 Unlike Judge
Sweet of the district court, who ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, Katyal did not claim that isolated
DNA is merely the “physical embodiment of [genetic] information.”207 He also disagreed,
however, with Judge Lourie’s claim that isolated DNA is a novel chemical entity just because of
the fact that covalent bonds are broken during its extraction. Katyal noted that according to
Judge Lourie’s logic, even elements such as lithium would be patentable because it is found in
nature within “salts with covalent bonds.”208 Echoing the voice of one biologist from the 1990s
who claimed that patenting ESTs would be “like trying to patent the periodic table”209, Katyal
insisted that nobody would think that “the third element in the periodic table” would be
patentable just because it has to be chemically extracted from its natural state.210
While satisfying neither party in the Myriad case, the DOJ position best illustrates the
point that innovation requires a balance of private incentives and public access. Tradeoffs must
be made, and must be clearly defined in order to guarantee sufficient access to the human
genome for researchers and clinicians. The evidence provided by the SACGHS strongly
suggests that Judge Laurie’s ruling and the USPTO’s de facto patentability policies fail to secure
the constitutional goal of promoting innovation and the general welfare. Judge Moore notes that
205
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the USPTO has granted patents on isolated DNA for the past 35 years, but this does not seem to
reflect a “split in the government” as much as it suggests a deviance in USPTO practices from
federal policy. During the EST/SNP patenting race and now again, the executive branch and its
agencies (i.e. NIH) have expressed concern over the detrimental effect gene patents have had on
open access to foundational scientific discoveries. Recently, the legislative branch has also taken
steps towards curtailing the continued expansion of gene patentability under the USPTO.
Although Congress fell short of eliminating gene patents in 2007, it took a significant
step last year towards greater regulation of patents on isolated DNA. In the America Invents Act
(AIA) passed last September,211 Congress required the USPTO to study and report on the effects
of current patent policy on gene testing.212 By expanding the definition of prior art and
establishing a post-grant opposition procedure to challenge patents, it also opens doors to future
patent counterstrategies such as those used by Merck Genome Initiative, SNP Consortium and
Dominique Stoppa-Lyonnet in the fight against patents on EST/SNPs and other isolated DNA.
While the AIA applies broadly to patents in other sectors as well (e.g. technology,
telecommunications), its provisions seem to suggest that the federal government does not support
Judge Laurie’s overly expansive view of human gene patentability.
Ultimately, the continued legal debate over the Myriad BRCA1/2 patents emphasizes the
need to protect the flow of clinically valuable information conveyed through isolated genomic
DNA. As Justice Breyer points out in the Prometheus ruling, patent protection is a double-edged
sword that can incentivize new discoveries but also slow down innovation.213 In order to
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promote the sciences and the useful arts, US patent policy must ensure that downstream
innovators in clinical diagnostics are able to isolate parts of the human genome without being
threatened by infringement lawsuits. The per se patentability rule espoused by Judge Laurie and
past USPTO policy fails to strike the proper balance between private incentives and scientific
inquiry. In order to tailor a better policy solution for the development of clinical diagnostics,
Congress should pass a rule that limits the restrictive impact of current patents while preserving
patent incentives for other biomedical products.

The Liability Exemption – in Support of the SACGHS Proposal:
As the courts continue to study AMP v. Myriad Genetics and the case for gene patent
policy reform, clinical diagnostic technology persists in its steady advance. For women at risk of
hereditary breast and ovarian cancer, however, Myriad’s patents on isolated DNA continue to
block affordable and reliable testing from other providers such as Kaiser Permanente and the
Yale Cancer Center. Given the broad impact of patent laws across a wide range of scientific
fields, the best policy solution for the near future may be an infringement liability exemption
limited to the research and diagnostic use of patented genes. As Justice Breyer noted in
Prometheus, changing patentability rules to solve issues within a specific field may lead to
unforeseen consequences in others.214 While leaving patent protections in place for their use in
the development of biologic therapeutics, the liability exemption would allow university labs and
health insurers to develop more accurate and cost-effective testing systems. Biopharmaceutical
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companies would continue to use their patents to attract investment, and also keep the twelveyear market exclusivity policy recently granted by the government. 215
Opponents of the liability exemption have argued, however, that this policy would reduce
innovation and decrease access to new diagnostic technologies. They insist that without the right
to exclude others from the use of isolated genomic DNA, clinical diagnostics manufacturers will
not be able to develop and deliver new tests. The claims they have advanced, however, seem
rather weak in light of the facts surrounding the development of the BRCA1/2 tests.
As noted in the Myriad case study, the evidence suggests that patents were not necessary
for the development of the BRCA1/2 test – university researchers such as Mary Clare King and
Michael Stratton had already discovered the genes, and researchers such as Dr. Ganguly had
already developed BRCA1/2 diagnostics independent of Myriad’s patents. Myriad used its
patents to clear the market of these preexisting tests.216 Myriad notes, however, that the patents,
by giving the firm monopoly control over the market, allowed it to invest in the marketing and
physician education necessary for the delivery of BRCA1/2 testing to patients.217 The issue with
this statement is that although the monopoly may have encouraged Myriad to increase its directto-consumer (DTC) marketing, the firm’s marketing and education tactics were unnecessary for
the delivery of BRCA1/2 testing to the public.218 The firm’s DTC “public awareness campaign”
was designed to manipulate preexisting public anxiety about hereditary breast cancer, and it left
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out most of the critical information necessary for the public’ education about BRCA1/2.219
Myriad paid sales account managers to provide physician “training,” but it blocked qualified
physicians and counselors from obtaining the full information from its test beyond the summary
it provided.220 Myriad’s publicity efforts increased demand for the firm’s products but impeded
the provision of quality genetic counseling and medical decision-making necessary for the
judicious use of BRCA1/2 testing. According to health insurer Kaiser Permanente, which has
covered Myriad’s BRCA1/2 test since 1997, the monopoly over clinical research has ultimately
had “negative effects on patient health.”221
Other opponents to the liability exemption have claimed that patent protections on
isolated DNA are necessary to encourage open science and reduce trade secrecy. However,
evidence from the SACGHS seriously undermines these claims. As mentioned by the Innovation
Partnership in the SACGHS report, patents disclose very little and do not provide researchers
with all the information necessary to replicate and improve the discovery. Trade secrecy in the
absence of these patents is weak because of the ease with which the covered products are reverse
engineered.
Combined with patents, however, trade secrecy can be used to hoard data critical to the
improvement of diagnostics for the target gene. Diagnostics producers can use this tactic to
prolong their market monopoly beyond the life of their patents. Despite the ethical implications
of this tactic, Myriad has decided to use this as its growth strategy in the coming years. Around
2008, the firm stopped submitting mutation data from its test results to the Breast Cancer
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Information Core (BIC).222 When asked about the matter, Mark Capone stated that Myriad
sought to prevent competitors from benefiting from its investment in the BRCA1/2 mutations.
Perhaps with a tinge of irony reminiscent of Celera’s restrictions on its data, this decision has
had a negative impact on the clinical research community that found the BRCA1/2 genes in the
first place. Myriad’ data hoarding strategy has made it more difficult for researchers in the BIC
consortium to study the demographics of the BRCA1/2 mutations and identify those with the
strongest links to cancer. 223 Granted, Myriad’s attempts to preserve its informational advantage
might have been justified if it produced sufficient utility to the public in return. As noted earlier
however, the advent of genomic scale sequencing has made Myriad’s technology rather
anachronistic. According to Mary Clare King, “Science has moved beyond what [Myriad] can
do. It’s not good for the science and it’s not good for the patients and their clinicians if they
cannot have the most complete, up-to-date information.”224 In 2010, King published findings
suggesting the application of “next generation sequencing to mutation detection for patients at
high risk of breast cancer.”225
Until this technology becomes widely applicable, Myriad plans to maintain its market
dominance in BRCA1/2 diagnostics by using its private database to compete on the basis of
reliability (2% VUS rate). This plan, however, is built on a rent-seeking monopoly strategy not
in line with the broader goal of social utility espoused in Article 1.8.8 of the Constitution. The
Genomics Law Report draws attention to this observation in its coverage of the Myriad debate,
noting that “the hoarding of immensely important clinical data does not seem likely “to promote
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the Progress of Science and the useful Arts.” 226 Through a liability exemption extending to the
research and diagnostic use of patented genes, Congress would be able to undo the negative
public health effects of this diagnostic monopoly while keeping patent protections in place for
therapeutics manufacturers.
Given the massive efforts at NHGRI and universities across the nation to translate
genomic scale sequencing technology to clinical practice in the next four years, it is highly
unlikely that maintaining research and diagnostic exclusivity over patented fragments of
naturally occurring DNA will be a sensible strategy for innovation in the future. As noted by
King, current whole exome sequencing technology makes the issue already anachronistic for the
genetic testing industry. According to Dr. Allen Bale at the Yale School of Medicine’s DNA
Diagnostic Lab, “With very little tweaking, exome sequencing will be as good [as] or better than
what Myriad has to offer. Turnaround time may be a problem in the near term, but not for long.
We are switching to exome sequencing for all genetic tests that involve panels of genes…as long
as there are no patent issues.”227 Along with the trade secrecy issue, this fact might help explain
why Myriad CEO Peter Meldrum commented (rather ironically), “If I had my druthers, I would
not want to go into a new market in a heavy-handed fashion, trying to enforce patents.”228 In the
long run, Myriad and other firms in the genetic diagnostics space plan to rely on genomic scale
sequencing, not tests for individual conditions.229
For this transition to succeed, however, it is of critical importance that researchers and
clinicians are able to test genomic scale sequencing in the clinical laboratory setting. Although
the CAFC’s reversal of Myriad’s method patents may allow a legal workaround for whole
226
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genome sequencing, there is still significant concern as to how Myriad’s remaining BRCA1/2
patents will affect the new sequencing methods. While some argue that whole genome
sequencing can circumvent Myriad’s remaining patents by using computerized searches of the
entire raw genomic sequence (as opposed to physically isolating the target sequences),230 the
necessary software is still in the early stages of development and the hypothetical defense has yet
to be tested in court. Because whole exome and micro-array tests still rely on the isolation of
target sequences of DNA, clinicians who use those tests to look for BRCA1/2 mutations will still
be subject to infringement lawsuits.
In the future, the development of advanced analytic software for whole genome
sequencing may eventually allow researchers to circumvent Myriad’s patents. Currently,
however, isolated DNA patents still pose a legal risk for genomic scale sequencing and prevent
the use of available whole exome sequencing technology. Because of Myriad’s patents,
geneticists continue to leave out BRCA1/2 in their sequencing activities out of concern that
Myriad will sue for infringement. When asked if the Yale DNA Diagnostics lab would be
prevented from reporting the results for BRCA1/2 mutations drawn from whole genome
sequencing, Dr. Allen Bale answered that “there is absolutely no doubt that Myriad would send a
cease and desist order should we report results of BRCA1 and BRCA2 testing based on whole
genome sequencing.” A liability exemption would allow Dr. Bale and other geneticists to
research the diagnostic application of genomic scale sequencing to BRCA1/2, unhampered by
Myriad patents.
Granted, one could point to the costs and risks involved in the biopharmaceutical industry
and claim that such a move would reduce incentives for developers of new genetic tests. In the
district court hearing of Ass’n for Molecular Pathology et al. v. U.S. Patent and Trademark
230
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Office et al., Myriad cited a recent BIO survey of diagnostic and therapeutic biotechnology
companies in which “77% of the respondents without approved products indicated that they
expect to spend 5-15 years and over $100 million developing a commercial product.”231 The
issue with that argument, however, is that the BIO statistic lumps diagnostics and therapeutics
together when in fact genetic test developers face much lower overhead expenses than
biopharmaceutical developers. Unlike pharmaceutical manufacturers, developers of laboratory
diagnostics do not have to create new active ingredients that require FDA approval. Although
companion diagnostics for therapeutics and diagnostic testing kits are subject to FDA regulation,
laboratory tests conducted by clinicians does not require FDA trials.
In fact, diagnostic monopolies built through patents on isolated DNA can actually hinder
the development of a companion test for a new therapeutic drug. In its public testimony to the
USPTO regarding exclusive gene patents, FORCE232 noted that Myriad did not seek FDA
approval for its diagnostic tests. Despite Myriad’s claims that patents like its own have helped
foster innovation, FORCE notes that the firm’s patents have prevented others from developing an
FDA-approved BRCA test, which in turn has hindered the efforts of drug companies who seek to
gain FDA approval for therapeutics such as PARP inhibitors.233 As noted by the SACGHS,
patents on human genes are not a critical incentive for the invention and commercialization of
genetic diagnostics.234 Given the continual rise in national healthcare expenditures and the
potential savings from new technologies, a liability exemption that creates opportunities for more
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cost-effective clinical research while preserving patent protection for novel products and
processes seems to be the best policy solution available at this time.

Conclusion:
By studying the history of the gene patenting controversy in greater detail, one can see
that patent policy on human genes is, like healthcare, a cultural as well as a scientific issue. It
challenges traditional capitalist theories by requiring governments to adapt market incentives to
changing social needs, through rules that may serve as exceptions to the theories of selfregulating markets and efficient intellectual property rights. It must deliver quantifiable results
towards an abstract goal, whether it is the promotion of innovation, health, or long-term
innovation in the protection of health. Such broad agendas require a certain degree of flexibility
– an exception to the rule that allows for a continued balance between the dual goals of
incentivizing the pursuit of knowledge and disclosing new findings. Examples of such
exceptions can be found in copyright law, the patenting of surgical methods and even in the
Bayh-Dole Act, which grants the NIH march-in rights for situations in which the patent-holder
fails to “achieve practical application of the subject invention.” This last exception, however,
has never been used and is effectively defunct. In order to promote innovation in downstream
genetic testing and the “useful art” of clinical diagnostics, Congress should consider the passage
of a clinical exemption for patents on isolated DNA.
In the long run, technological progress in genome sequencing and analysis might
eventually inspire a more appropriate standard for gene patentability. For now, however, there is
an urgent, demonstrable need for an infringement liability exemption covering the research and
diagnostic use of isolated human DNA. Delaying the clinical application of techniques such as
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whole-exome sequencing in order to protect existing patents on BRCA1/2 and other genes is not
the way to ensure continued scientific progress. With the coming of personalized medicine, an
increasing number of patients will rely on more comprehensive genetic tests to determine
whether they have a hereditary predisposition for not just breast cancer, but a myriad of other
chronic diseases. Accurate test results would help physicians target high-risk patients for early
detection and treatment, and ultimately help save lives.
One cannot deny that the liberalization of biomedical patent policy in Diamond v.
Chakrabarty and the Bayh-Dole Act had a significant role in driving the rapid progress of
biotechnology. Yet Chakrabarty adhered to an implicit rule against patenting laws of nature, and
the Bayh-Dole Act acknowledged the common law research exemption (at least until Madey).
Removing these protections threatens downstream innovation – the goose that ultimately lays the
golden eggs. Patents imply a quid pro quo – as noted by Justice Breyer in Prometheus, they act
as a double-edged sword. Although they can help promote innovation through private
incentives, they can also impede it by preventing free inquiry and restricting access. Heller and
Eisenberg’s hypothetical “tragedy of the anticommons” has yet to fully rear its ugly head, but the
BRCA1/2 controversy has demonstrated that there must be limits to the enforceability of patents
on isolated fragments of human genomic DNA. In order to preserve the balance struck by the
Constitution between the social distortion and utility created by patents, Congress should enact a
research and diagnostic exemption designed to improve access to information. Otherwise, we
may fail to promote the balanced progress of science and the useful arts that gave patents their
social value in the first place.
Thus, while there are strong reasons not to ban all gene patents outright, there are
compelling reasons to limit their enforceability to more socially and economically reasonable
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bounds. Granted, stronger protection of formal intellectual property rights can help innovators
attract more private investments from creditors and shareholders. At a general level, the
economic incentive created by stronger patents seems to help advance scientific knowledge by
addressing the market failure that stems from its nonrivalrous nature as a public good. A ban on
all gene-related patents might threaten not just therapeutics manufacturers but the patients who
rely on them as well. The private incentive that gene patents provide, however, is just one means
to an end rather than the end itself. If patent policy is to improve quality of life standards for
society as a whole, it must be aligned with the nation’s social goals of biomedical innovation and
patient access to timely care. While these goals may be shaped in part by the structural
necessities of the market, they will hopefully allow for a more practical and sustainable balance
between the costs and benefits of technological progress.
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Figure 1: Average yearly number of DNA patents issued, by decade
Source: Data from the DNA Patents Database at Georgetown University, found in
Sam Kean, “The Human Genome (Patent) Project,” Science 331 (2011): 531.

12

1970s

143

1980s

1606

1990s

0

500

1000

1500

2000

Figure 2: Visual representation of the role of Express Sequence Tags
Source: National Center for Biotechnology Information
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/About/primer/est.html
Genes are areas of the
human genome that code
for physical traits, which
are expressed as proteins.
The sections of DNA that
are expressed are called
exons, and they are
transcribed into mRNA
(another nucleic acid that
acts as a template for
protein synthesis during
translation). As this
graphic shows, the regions
of DNA that aren’t
physically expressed
(introns) are not included
in the process of
transcription, so that the
mRNA includes only the
genetic information that
codes for the trait. cont’d
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Because mRNA is not
stable outside of the
human body, researchers
capture and store its
sequence by converting it
to cDNA. ESTs “tag”
genes by capturing either
the beginning (5’ EST) or
ending (3’ EST) portion of
this cDNA sequence.
When mRNA is
transcribed from DNA
and again when cDNA is
synthesized from mRNA,
the sequence is preserved
due to complementarity
rules between the
nucleotides (A with T/U,
C with G). The cost of the
technology behind EST
synthesis is very low.

Figure 3: Visual representation of Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms (SNPs)
Source: US Department of Energy: Human Genome Project Information, SNP Fact Sheet
Single Nucleotide
Polymorphisms are point
mutations that affect only
the given base pair and
leave the rest of the
sequence unchanged.
Although they do not
always affect the amino
acid sequence that
determines protein
structure, when SNPs lead
to the expression of a
different amino acid they
can create a different
protein or cut off protein
production prematurely.
SNPs account for 90% of
all genetic variation in
humans.

Wikipedia image: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Dna-SNP.svg
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Figure 4: Laboratories prevented from performing diagnostic tests due to gene patents
Survey results from Mildred K. Cho et al., "Effects of Patents and Licenses on the Provision of
Clinical Genetic Testing Services," Journal of Molecular Diagnostics 5.1 (2003): 3-8.
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Figure 5: Visual representation of whole exome sequencing (see footnote on p. 50)
Source: GenXPro©: Products and Services: Exome Sequencing
http://www.genxpro.info/products_and_services/Exome_Sequencing/
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Figure 6: Rise in number of DNA patents issued, 1971 – 2010
Source: Dr. Robert Cook-Deegan, Capitol Hill Briefing on Gene Patents, 15 Sept 2011
http://ondemand.duke.edu/video/28953/capitol-hill-briefing-on-gene-
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